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One of the notable features of inflation targeting as an approach to the conduct of
monetary policy has been the increased degree of transparency on the part of inflation-
targeting central banks, not only as to their decisions but also with regard to the goals
that policy seeks to achieve and the reasoning behind individual decisions. The degree
to which this makes it appropriate, or even necessary, for inflation-targeting central
banks to speak in advance about future policy decisions has been a topic of debate,1
but over time, inflation-targeting central banks such as the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand, the Norges Bank, and Sveriges Riksbank have also led the way in increasing
the degree of explicit communication about the likely forward path of short-term
interest rates on a regular basis.
More recently, many central banks have found immediate cuts in their policy rate
an insufficient response to the effects of the global financial crisis, and this has led to
increased interest in explicit “forward guidance” about future interest-rate policy as
an additional policy tool. This raises questions about the usefulness of this additional
dimension of policy in the context of the kind of forecast-targeting procedures already
used by many of the leading inflation-targeting central banks. Notably, the UK
Treasury’s recent review of the monetary policy framework of the Bank of England
(HM Treasury, 2013) requests the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee to assess the
merits of “the use of intermediate thresholds” as an additional element of policy, and
to report on the outcome of that assessment later this year.
Here I first review the general role of discussions of the forward path of the policy
rate, and of explicit intermediate targets for policy, as elements of an inflation forecast-
targeting approach to monetary policy. I then turn to the special role of forward
guidance in the case that a central bank finds itself constrained by a practical lower
bound on where it can (or is willing to) set its policy rate. I review recent experience
with various approaches to forward guidance in that situation, including the Federal
Reserve’s December 2012 introduction of quantitative “thresholds,” and discuss the
appropriate role of such intermediate targets in a forecast-targeting framework.
1See, e.g., Goodhart (2005) for a skeptical discussion.
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1 The Forward Path of Policy in a Forecast-Targeting
Framework
Central banks with explicit inflation targets have emphasized from the start that
it is not reasonable to expect a central bank to be able to keep the measured rate
of inflation exactly equal to the target rate at all times. They have in particular
stressed that it is difficult for a shift in monetary policy, even a relatively drastic one,
to greatly affect the rate of inflation over the near term (that is, for at least several
months following the meeting at which a policy decision is taken); and they have
accordingly stressed that the goal of policy should instead be to ensure that inflation
can be expected to return to the target rate fairly soon, even when it currently differs
from that rate. Hence both policy decisions and communication with the public about
those decisions have come to focus on projections for the future path of the economy
(and in particular, projections for one or more measures of inflation), and the extent
to which these are consistent with the bank’s official target.
But while inflation-targeting central banks have in this sense necessarily adopted
a forward-looking approach to monetary policy, it has not obviously followed that the
policy framework requires explicit consideration in advance of an intended forward
path for the policy rate, or other policy instruments, still less any communication
with the public about the policy committee’s thoughts on that matter. Some early
discussions of inflation-forecast targeting made it appear that one should be able to
determine the appropriate current setting for the policy rate simply by reference to
a projection for future inflation conditional on that rate, without having to make
any specific assumption about future policy decisions. For example, in the early
exposition of inflation-forecast targeting by Svensson (1997), a model is assumed in
which the policy rate affects economic activity only with a lag of a year, and activity
affects inflation, but only with an additional lag of a year. (Both effects are purely
backward-looking; expectations play no role in the determination of either output or
inflation.) Hence the model can be reduced to a single structural equation of the form
πt = ut − γit−2, (1.1)
where πt is the inflation rate, it is the policy rate, ut is a composite of all of the
other factors influencing inflation (assumed to evolve independently of the path of
the policy rate), periods correspond to years, and γ > 0 is a constant coefficient.
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It is then easily shown that the policy that minimizes the expected squared devi-
ation of the inflation rate from the inflation target π∗ is one that sets it each period
so as to ensure that the inflation forecast satisfies
Etπt+2 = π
∗; (1.2)
if the forecast is produced using the model (1.1), this will require that
it = γ
−1 [Etut+2 − π∗]. (1.3)
Note that the optimization required in order to determine the setting (1.3) for it can
be carried out without considering how iτ will be set for any τ > t. Each meeting of
the policy committee can be treated as an involving an independent decision, and the
inflation target alone suffices to allow a determinate decision on each occasion and
to allow the decision to be justified to the public by reference to the target criterion
(1.2).
However, these conclusions depend on overly simplistic features of the proposed
model. The model (1.1) assumes not merely that interest-rate decisions have delayed
effects, but that there are no effects until the future horizon (two years later) at
which the main effect will suddenly occur. If one grants that the largest effects occur
with a delay, it is more reasonable to suppose that a policy change begins to have an
effect at some point prior to the date at which the largest effect occurs. Yet even this
small modification of one’s assumptions would have important consequences for the
forecast-targeting exercise.
Suppose, for example, that inflation is determined by a purely backward-looking
model of the form
πt = ut − γ1it−1 − γ2it−2, (1.4)
where γ2 > γ1 > 0, so that an increase in the policy rate lowers inflation to some
extent in the following year, but by an even greater amount in the year after that.
And suppose that the central bank wishes to conduct policy so as to minimize a loss




βT−t(πT − π∗)2, (1.5)
for some discount factor 0 < β < 1. The optimal policy can no longer be characterized
as setting the policy rate each period so as to ensure that inflation is forecasted to
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equal the target at the shortest horizon at which inflation can be affected. This would
now require using policy to ensure that
Etπt+1 = π
∗, (1.6)
which would require that
it = γ
−1
1 [Etut+1 − π∗ − γ2it−1]. (1.7)
But since the evolution of ut (and hence of the forecasts Etut+1) is independent of
the path of the policy rate, (1.7) would imply explosive dynamics of the policy rate.
Assuming that such an explosive path for the policy rate is infeasible, it will
not in fact be possible to ensure that (1.6) is satisfied at all times. It will then
not be possible to determine the optimal choice for it each period simply by seeking
to minimize Et[(πt+1 − π∗)2] given the effect of it on πt+1, and trusting that further
delayed effects of the current policy decision can be costlessly offset by adjustments of
subsequent policy. Instead, it will be necessary to take into account the consequences
of the choice of it for the expected values of all of the terms in (1.5), which will require
a consideration at time t of how policy should be conducted later.
Let Vt−1(it−2) denote the minimum achievable value of the conditional expectation
at t−1 of the objective (1.5), under optimal choices of the policy rate from date t−1
onward, but taking as given the past policy decision it−2. Then the policy decision
at any date t can be expressed as the choice of it so as to minimize
Et[(πt+1 − π∗)2 + βVt+1(it)],
subject to the constraint that πt+1 will be determined by (1.4). But this problem
cannot be solved without evaluating Et[Vt+1(it)], which requires a consideration of
how policy is expected to be conducted at t+ 1 and later (indeed, into the indefinite
future).
Hence optimal policy, and indeed an internally consistent forecast-targeting ex-
ercise, will almost inevitably require a determination at each decision point of what
the entire anticipated forward path of the policy rate should be, even though this
need not mean that a once-and-for-all decision about policy is made at some initial
date, and then simply executed thereafter. In practice, the number of future contin-
gencies that may arise will be much too large to make it possible to solve explicitly
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for a state-contingent policy years in advance and be content to simply implement it
thereafter by deciding which of the contingencies that had been previously foreseen as
possible has actually occurred. At the same time, some assessment of the dependence
of Et[Vt+1(it)] on the value of it is necessary, and this requires a forecast of how policy
is expected to be made subsequently, even if it is inevitable that actual future policy
will depend on complications that cannot yet be anticipated.
1.1 Medium-Run Forecast Targeting without Choosing a For-
ward Path
In practice, inflation-targeting central banks have not supposed that their procedures
should seek to ensure that forecasted inflation must equal the target rate at the
shortest horizon at which inflation can still be influenced, if indeed such a horizon
can even be defined. It has generally been recognized that returning inflation to
the target rate as quickly as possible would not necessarily be optimal; the focus
has instead often been on ensuring that inflation should return to target over some
specified horizon, where the horizon is chosen to be far enough in the future to
ensure not only that inflation can actually be controlled with some accuracy over
that horizon, but that always planning to return inflation to the target rate over that
horizon should not require excessively sharp adjustments of real variables, while it is
still near enough to maintain a reasonably tight bound on the implied variability of
the inflation rate around its target value. (Typically, horizons two to three years in
the future have been considered suitable.)
However, early discussions of forecast targeting in this vein still often sought
to make it possible for a central bank to make a separate interest-rate decision at
each decision point without prejudging future policy decisions. For example, the
Bank of England’s forecast-targeting procedure (Vickers, 1998; Goodhart, 2001) was
described as being based on a constant-interest-rate forecast, in which forward paths
for inflation and other variables were projected under the assumption of a constant
value for the policy rate over the forecast horizon. Letting Ft,t+8(i) be the forecast
of πt+8, the inflation rate eight quarters in the future, under the assumption that
the policy rate is kept at an arbitrary level i until then,2 then the procedure was
2Note that this formulation of the exercise is only possible under the assumption that a purely
backward-looking model is used to forecast inflation, as was the case at the Bank of England at
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described as choosing at each decision point an operating target it for the policy rate
so as to ensure that
Ft,t+8(it) = π
∗. (1.8)
The policy decision was then justified to the public by presenting, at the begin-
ning of each issue of the Bank’s Inflation Report, a figure showing the projected path
of inflation under the constant-interest-rate assumption, with the interest rate at the
level chosen in the most recent meeting of the Monetary Policy Committee. (The
projection was presented in the form of a “fan chart,” showing a probability distri-
bution for future inflation outcomes at each horizon, rather than a point forecast.)
This figure always included a horizontal line at the target inflation rate, and a dashed
vertical line at the horizon eight quarters in the future, so that the eye could easily
determine the extent to which the projection was consistent with the target criterion
(1.8), by observing whether the modal predicted path of inflation passed through the
intersection of the two lines.3
This approach had the advantage of allowing an interest-rate decision to be made
at each decision point without requiring any explicit consideration of current inten-
tions with regard to future policy. It also had the advantage of allowing definite
decisions to be made about the appropriate current level of the policy rate, by mak-
ing even a quarter-percent change appear quite consequential, insofar it is treated as
a permanent change of that size in the projection exercise, rather than only a change
in the target to be pursued until the next meeting. Nonetheless, there were serious
conceptual problems with the approach (Goodhart, 2001; Leitemo, 2003; Honkapohja
and Mitra, 2005; Woodford, 2005).
While the assumption of a future policy rate at the same level as the current
operating target might seem a natural one, at least in the absence of clear reasons
to expect the future to be different from the present, it is actually not at all sensi-
ble to suppose that short-term nominal interest rates should remain fixed at some
the time. A similar approach to inflation-forecast targeting was used for some years by Sveriges
Riksbank as well (Jansson and Vredin, 2003).
3The inflation projection continues to be presented at the front of each Inflation Report using
this format, just before the summary discussion of the most recent policy decision, though it is no
longer a constant-interest-rate forecast (as discussed below). The justifications given for the policy
decision in more recent years also do not suggest quite so simple a target criterion; for example,
there are now frequent references to inflation projections beyond the 8-quarter horizon, as well as
to the projection for output growth.
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level, regardless of how inflation or other variables may evolve. Indeed, in forward-
looking (rational-expectations) models of the kind that are now often used by central
banks, the assumption of a constant nominal interest rate typically implies an inde-
terminate price level, so that it becomes impossible to solve uniquely for an inflation
forecast under any such interest-rate assumption.4 In models with backward-looking
expectations, the model can be solved, but such policies often imply explosive infla-
tion dynamics. Such difficulties appears to have been a frequent problem with the
constant-interest rate projections of the Bank of England (Goodhart, 2001), which
often showed the inflation rate passing through the target rate at the eight-quarter
horizon, but not converging to it. Figure 1 provides an example. In such a case,
it is not obvious why anyone should believe that policy is consistent with the infla-
tion target, or expect that inflation expectations should be anchored as a result of a
commitment to such a policy.
The most fundamental problem, however, is the internal inconsistency involved in
the sequential application of such a procedure. The usefulness of a forecast-targeting
procedure as a way of creating confidence that the inflation target should be expected
to be satisfied in the medium run — so that it should serve to anchor medium-run
expectations — depends on the public’s having reason to suppose that the central
bank’s projections do indeed represent reasonable forecasts of the economy’s future
evolution. But among the possible grounds for doubt is a tension inherent in the logic
of a forecast-targeting procedure itself. Production of projections of the economy’s
evolution years into the future requires that the central bank make assumptions about
the path of policy variables, such as nominal interest rates, not merely in the imme-
diate future, but over the entire forecast horizon (and even beyond, in the case of a
forward-looking model). But while the projections must specify policy far into the
future each time they are produced, in each decision cycle policy is only chosen for
a short period of time (say, for the coming month, after which there will be another
decision).
This raises a question as to whether this decision procedure should be expected
to actually produce the kind of future policy that is assumed in the projections. One
might imagine, for example, a central bank wishing always to choose expansionary
policy at the present moment, to keep employment high, while projecting that infla-
tion will be reduced a year or two in the future, so that the expectation of disinflation
4See Woodford (2003, chap. 4) for examples of this problem.
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Figure 1: The Bank of England’s February 2004 CPI projection under the assumption
of a constant 4.0 percent interest rate. Source: Bank of England, Inflation Report,
August 2004.
will make it possible to have high employment with only moderate inflation. But if
the procedure is one in which the disinflation is always promised two years farther in
the future, private decisionmakers have no reason ever to expect any disinflation at
all.
Thus a requirement for credibility of the central bank’s projections is that the
forecast-targeting procedure be intertemporally consistent. This means that the fu-
ture policy that is assumed in the projections should coincide with the policy that
the procedure itself can be expected to recommend, as long as those aspects of fu-
ture conditions that are outside the control of the central bank turn out in the way
that is currently anticipated. But the approach to forecast-targeting represented by
requirement (1.8) fails to satisfy this criterion.
The problem is that there will often be no reason to expect interest rates to
remain constant over the policy horizon. Indeed, constant-interest rate projections
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themselves often imply that the people making the projections should not expect
the interest rate to be maintained over the forecast horizon. Consider, for example,
the inflation projection shown in Figure 1, a constant-interest rate projection on the
basis of which the February 2004 Bank of England Inflation Report concluded that
a 4 percent policy rate was appropriate at that time.5 The figure shows that under
the assumption of a constant 4 percent policy rate, consumer price inflation was
projected (under the most likely evolution, indicated by the darkest area) to pass
through the target rate of 2.0 percent at the eight-quarter horizon (indicated by the
vertical dashed line), and then to continue rising in the following year.
It follows that if the policy rate were to be held at 4 percent for a year, the
Bank’s expectation in February 2004 should have been that (under the most likely
evolution, given what was known then) in February 2005 a similar exercise would
forecast consumer price inflation to pass through 2.0 percent at the one-year horizon,
and to exceed 2.0 percent during the second year of the projection. Hence, the Bank
has essentially forecasted that in a year’s time, under the most likely evolution, the
policy committee would have reason to raise the policy rate. Thus the February 2004
projection itself could have been taken as evidence that the Bank should not have
expected the policy rate to remain at 4 percent over the following eight quarters.
As these issues have come to be understood, a number of central banks that for-
merly relied upon constant-interest-rate projections (including the Bank of England,
since August 2004) have switched to an alternative approach. This is the construction
of projections based on market expectations of the future path of short-term interest
rates, as inferred from the term structure of interest rates and/or futures markets.
In the case that the projections constructed under this assumption satisfy the target
criterion, the correct current interest-rate decision is taken to be the one consistent
with market expectations. The use of projections based on market expectations al-
lows a central bank to avoid assuming a constant interest rate when there are clear
reasons to expect rates to change soon, while still not expressing any view of its own
about the likely future path of interest rates.
But the market expectations approach does not really solve the problem of internal
5In the February Report, only the projection up to the 8-quarter horizon was shown. The figure
that has been extended to a horizon 12 quarters in the future is taken from the August 2004 Inflation
Report, in which the Bank explained its reasons for abandoning the method of constant-interest-rate
projections.
9
consistency just raised.6 One problem is that market expectations can at most supply
a single candidate forward path for policy; it is not clear what decision one is supposed
to make if that path does not lead to projections consistent with the target criterion.
Thus the procedure is incompletely specified; and if it is only the projections based
on market expectations that are published, even though the central bank has chosen
to contradict those expectations, the published projections cannot be expected to
shape private decisionmakers’ forecasts of the economy’s evolution.
Moreover, even if the forward path implied by market expectations does lead
to projections that fulfill the target criterion, the exercise is not intertemporally
consistent if this path does not in fact correspond to the central bank’s own forecast
of the likely future path of interest rates. Why should it count as a justification of a
current interest-rate decision that this would be the first step along a path that would
imply satisfaction of the target criterion, but that the central bank does not actually
expect to be followed? And why should anyone who correctly understands the central
bank’s procedures base their own forecasts on published projections constructed on
such an assumption?
1.2 Sequential Choice of a Forward Path
In fact, there is no possibility of an intertemporally consistent forecast-targeting pro-
cedure that does not require the central bank to model its own likely future conduct
as part of the projection exercise. Approaches like both of those just described —
which introduce an artificial assumption about the path of interest rates in order to
allow the central bank to avoid expressing any view about policy decisions that need
not yet be made — necessarily result in inconsistencies. Instead, a consistent projec-
tion exercise must make assumptions that allow the evolution of the central bank’s
policy instrument to be projected, along with the projections for inflation and other
endogenous variables.
In such a case, it would be possible, but somewhat awkward, for the central bank
to remain silent about the implications of its assumptions for the forward path of
interest rates; and so it is natural to include an interest-rate projection among the
projections that are discussed in the Monetary Policy Report.7 This has been done
6For further discussion of problems with this approach, see Woodford (2005) and Rosenberg
(2007).
7Since one is talking about projections for the paths of endogenous variables, rather than an-
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for the past decade now by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, and is now done by
the Norges Bank (since 2005) and the Riksbank (since 2007) as well. In the case of
the latter two central banks, “fan charts” (similar to the one shown in Figure 1) are
presented for the policy rate; this (among other things) makes it clear that the path is
simply a forecast, rather than a definite intention that has already been formulated,
let alone a promise.
But how should future policy be specified in such an exercise? It is sometimes
suggested that the monetary policy committee should conceive of its task as the choice
of a path for interest rates, rather than a single number for the current operating
target, in each decision cycle. Discussions of the feasibility of such an approach have
often stressed the potential difficulty of committee voting on a decision with so many
dimensions.8 And when announcing its intention to begin publishing its own view of
the path of the policy rate, the Riksbank (Rosenberg, 2007) indicated that it would
publish “forecasts ... based on an interest-rate path chosen by the Executive Board.”9
However, the idea that one should simply ask the policy committee to decide
which forward path for interest rates they prefer, presumably after asking their staff
to produce projections for other variables conditional on each path that is considered,
is problematic on several grounds that have nothing to do with the complexity of
the decision or the need for a committee to agree among themselves. First of all,
the specification of future policy by a simple path for a short-term nominal interest
rate, independently of how endogenous variables may develop, is never a sensible
nouncing an intention, there is no reason why there need be a projection for only one interest rate,
or even for the interest rate that is most emphasized to be the policy rate. Nonetheless, there are
obvious advantages in giving primarily emphasis to only a small number of key variables; and it
might seem disingenuous not to offer a view of the path of the policy rate, given that this is most
directly under the bank’s own control.
8See, for example, Goodhart (2005) for a skeptical view; Svensson (2007) responds by proposing
a voting mechanism intended to overcome potential intransitivities in majority preferences over
alternative paths.
9It is likely, of course, that this was only a loose way of speaking in a statement intended for a
non-technical audience, and that the intention was to indicate that the Executive Board would have
to endorse the assumptions about future policy involved in generating projections of an endogenous
interest-rate path. The change in procedure does seem to have meant that the Executive Board is
now required to approve the assumptions made in the projections in a way that was not previously
true; this has made it necessary to allow for possible revisions in the projections following the
meeting at which the policy decision is made (Sveriges Riksbank, 2007, p. 21.)
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choice, and is unlikely to lead to well-behaved results in a sensible model. (The
problems mentioned above in connection with the assumption of a constant interest-
rate path apply equally to any specification of an exogenous path; they do not result
from the assumption that the interest rate does not vary with time, but from the
assumption that it is independent of outcomes for inflation and other variables.)
Moreover, the assumption of a specific path for interest rates, unaffected by future
shocks, would seem to require one to publish a specific path for this variable, alongside
the fan charts for variables such as inflation; but this would encourage the dangerous
misunderstanding that the bank has already committed itself to follow a definite path
long in advance.
Even supposing that these technical issues have been finessed,10 there remains the
more fundamental problem of the intertemporal consistency of the procedure. Here
it is important to realize that the mere use of a consistent criterion over time to
rank alternative projected paths for the endogenous variables — not just a criterion
that provides a transitive ordering of outcomes within each decision cycle, but one
that ranks different possible paths the same way, regardless of the date at which the
decision is being made — is not enough to ensure intertemporal consistency, in the
sense defined above. Thus the problems of choosing a forward path for policy are
not resolved simply by asking the members of the policy committee to agree on a
loss function that they will then use (for an entire sequence of meetings) to rank
alternative possible outcomes, as proposed by Svensson (2007).
Even in the case of a single decisionmaker who minimizes a well-defined loss func-
tion that remains the same over time, using a correct economic model that also
remains the same over time, and who never makes any calculation errors, the choice
of a new optimal path for policy each period will not general lead to intertemporal
consistency. For in the case of a forward-looking model of the transmission mecha-
nism, the procedure will lead to the choice of a forward path for policy that one will
not be lead by the same procedure to continue in subsequent decision cycles, even if
10For example, one might specify future policy by a policy rule, such a Taylor rule, with some
number of free parameters that are optimized, in each decision cycle, so as to result in projections
that are acceptable to the monetary policy committee. If only rules that are considered that imply a
determinate equilibrium, the first problem is avoided. And since the rule that is chosen would make
the interest rate endogenous, an assumption about the distribution of shocks in each future period
would result in a probability distribution for future interest rates, just as for the future inflation
rate.
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there have been no unexpected developments in the meantime.
The reason is the same as in the celebrated argument of Kydland and Prescott
(1977) for the “time inconsistency of optimal plans”: the forward path chosen at one
time will take account of the benefits at earlier dates of certain expectations about
policy at the later dates, but as the later dates approach (and the earlier expectations
are now historical facts), there will no longer be a reason to take into account any
effect of the policy chosen for those dates on earlier expectations. This problem does
not arise solely in connection with the bias in the average rate of inflation chosen by
a sequential optimizer, as in the example of Kydland and Prescott (1977). One may
solve the problem of “inflationary bias” by assigning the central bank a loss function
in which the target level of the output gap is not higher than the level consistent on
average with its inflation target, but the optimal dynamic responses to shocks are
still not generally the ones that would be chosen under sequential (or discretionary)
optimization.11
1.3 Using a Target Criterion to Determine the Forward Path
An alternative approach, that avoids this problem, is to determine the forward path
of policy as that path which results in projections that satisfy a sequence of quan-
titative target criteria, one for each of a sequence of future horizons. It is true that
a single criterion — say, involving the projections for 8 quarters in the future only
— can determine only a single dimension of policy, and thus can only determine an
entire path if one is constrained to consider only a one-parameter family of possible
paths (such as constant-interest-rate paths). But a sequence of similar criteria can
independently determine the stance of policy at each of a sequence of dates, and
thus can determine the entire forward path of policy. Moreover, if the sequence of
11In the literature on inflation targeting, it is sometimes supposed instead that there is no problem
with allowing a central bank complete discretion in its choice of the instrument settings that will
minimize its loss function, as long as the loss function involves an output-gap target that is consistent
with the inflation target; hence inflation targeting is argued to differ from purely discretionary policy
only in the fact that policy is made on the basis of a loss function with this property. King (1997)
obtains a formal result to this effect, but in the context of a model where the aggregate-supply
relation is assumed to be of the “New Classical” form assumed by Kydland and Prescott (1977).
The result is in fact dependent on extremely special properties of that form of aggregate-supply
relation; see Woodford (2003, chap. 7) for further discussion.
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target criteria for different horizons are of the same form — i.e., if the target crite-
rion is independent of the horizon — then the forecast-targeting procedure will be
intertemporally consistent.
As a practical example, consider the targeting procedure used by the Norges
Bank in 2005-06. Each issue of the Bank’s Inflation Report included a box labeled
“Criteria for an appropriate future interest rate path.”12 According to the first of
the criteria listed, “inflation should be stabilized near the target [i.e., 2.5 percent per
year] within a reasonable time horizon, normally 1-3 years,” and moving toward that
target rate even sooner. This criterion alone would sound similar to the Bank of
England target criterion mentioned above, except with greater vagueness about the
horizon. But there is then a second criterion: that “the inflation gap [the amount
by which actual inflation exceeds the medium-run target rate] and the output gap
should be in reasonable proportion to each other until they close,” and in particular
that the two gaps “should normally not be positive or negative at the same time.”
The second criterion indicates not only what the projections should look like in
some medium run, but also what the transition path should look like: there should
be an inverse relation between the inflation gap and the output gap, with the two
gaps shrinking to zero together. In order to allow visual inspection of the extent
to which the projections satisfy this criterion, the Norges Bank presents a figure in
which the projections for its preferred measures of inflation13 and of the output gap
are superimposed. A criterion of this kind can determine the entire forward path
for policy. And with such a criterion, it is not necessary to specify independently
the rate at which the inflation rate should be projected to approach the target rate;
the appropriate rate is exactly the rate that allows the output gap to remain in the
desired proportion to the inflation gap. (Under such a criterion, the inflation gap
will be projected to close eventually, as long as it is not possible to have a non-zero
permanent output gap.)
The criterion just cited applies to each of a sequence of future horizons. It can be
12The criteria used starting in 2005, when the Norges Bank first began to announce a forward
path for the policy rate as part of its explanation of its recent policy decisions, are discussed in more
detail in Qvigstad (2006). Beginning with the 2007/1 issue of the Bank’s Monetary Policy Report,
the description of the criterion used to select the forward path of policy has been less explicit; see
Qvigstad (2008) for a more recent discussion of the criteria.
13The inflation measure emphasized by the Norges Bank in its targeting procedure, CPI-ATE, is
a consumer price index that is adjusted for tax changes and energy prices.
14
represented formally as the requirement that
(πt+h,t − π∗) + φxt+h,t = 0 (1.9)
for each horizon h ≥ h, for some coefficient φ > 0. Here yt+h,t denotes the projected
value at date t of some variable y, at a horizon h periods in the future; h ≥ 0 indicates
the shortest horizon at which it is still possible for policy to affect the projections, and
I shall assume that a sequence of criteria (1.9) for h ≥ h suffices to uniquely determine
the acceptable projections (including an implied forward path for policy).14
Suppose also that the central bank’s forecast of its own forecasts in future decision
cycles satisfy the principle that one should expect one’s future forecasts to be the same
as one’s current forecasts (except, of course, as a result of developments that cannot
currently be foreseen), so that
[yt+h2,t+h1 ],t = yt+h2,t
for any horizons h2 ≥ h1 ≥ 0. Then if at date t a forward path for policy is chosen
that leads to projections satisfying (1.9) for each h ≥ h, it should also be projected
at that time that at any later date t+ h1, the continuation of that same path should
lead to projections satisfying a corresponding sequential criterion, since at date t the
bank should project that
[(πt+h2,t+h1 − π∗) + φxt+h2,t+h1 ],t = 0
for all horizons h2 ≥ h1 + h. This makes the procedure of choosing a forward path
for policy on such a basis intertemporally consistent.
I believe that this kind of targeting procedure provides the most appealing solution
to the problem of intertemporal consistency. The way in which the target criterion
is used to determine an appropriate forward path for policy is essentially the same
as under the procedure used by the Bank of England prior to 2004, as discussed
above, except without either the arbitrary emphasis on a single horizon or the arbi-
trary restriction to forward paths for policy involving a constant interest rate. Since
forecast-targeting central banks already publish charts showing their projections for
14See Svensson and Woodford (2005) for algebraic analysis of a specific example. In the case
considered there, prices and spending decisions are each predetermined a period in advance, so that
h = 1.
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each of a sequence of future horizons, rather than only presenting a set of numeri-
cal forecasts for a specific horizon, discussion of a target criterion that should apply
at each horizon is fairly straightforward within the existing frameworks for deliber-
ation and communication about policy, as the example of the Norges Bank shows.
Moreover, both the Norges Bank and the Riksbank now discuss quite explicitly the
fact that their targeting procedures involve the choice of a forward path for policy,
and publish “fan charts” for the paths of short-term nominal interest rates implicit in
their projections. Hence this aspect of the recommended approach is entirely possible
within the context of existing procedures as well.
The main practical obstacle to such an approach, I believe, is that it would require
a central bank to adopt a highly structured approach to policy deliberations, and to
describe that approach rather explicitly to the public. It would require the bank to be
more open about its own view of the likely future evolution of policy than even some
forecast-targeting central banks have been willing to be thus far. And it would require
the bank to discuss explicitly the nature of the trade-offs that determine an acceptable
transition path following a disturbance, and not merely the nature of the “medium-
run” targets that one hopes to reach some years in the future. The latter goal will
almost surely require that a bank be explicit about the ways in which projections
for variables other than a single measure of inflation are relevant to judgments about
the appropriate stance of policy. Even though all inflation-targeting central banks
appear to care about projections for real variables as well as inflation,15 most have
been quite cautious about discussing the way in which this may factor into their
policy decisions. But this would have to be different if forecast targeting were to
be adopted by an institution with a “dual mandate” like the U.S. Federal Reserve
(at least, in the absence of a substantial modification of the Federal Reserve Act by
Congress). And even in the case of other central banks, I believe that it would greatly
enhance the transparency of policymaking — and ultimately, the credibility of their
commitments to inflation control, by making clearer the extent to which temporary
failures to return inflation immediately to its medium-run target level are nonetheless
consistent with a systematic approach to policy that does indeed guarantee stability
15For example, the summary justification of current policy in the introduction to each issue of the
Bank of England’s Inflation Report always begins by discussing the projection for real GDP growth
before turning to the inflation projection, despite the apparent concern with the inflation projection
alone in the simple target criterion discussed above.
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of inflation over the medium run.
1.4 Which Form of Target Criterion?
These general considerations do not mean that the specific form of target criterion
(1.9) used by the Norges Bank in the period just cited is necessarily the one that
should be adopted. In the context of a simple New Keynesian DSGE model, one
can show (Woodford, 2003, chap. 7) that an optimal policy commitment involves
maintaining proportionality, not between deviations of the inflation rate from its
long-run target and the output gap, but between deviations of the inflation rate
from target and the change in the output gap. That is, rather than requiring that
(πt−π∗)+φxt be projected to equal zero at all future horizons, one should commit to
a forward path of policy under which (πt−π∗)+φ(xt−xt−1) is projected to equal zero
at all horizons.16 Like the Norges Bank criterion, this one implies that both inflation
and the output gap should be stabilized, in the absence of “cost-push shocks” that
make the two stabilization goals mutually incompatible; and that in the event of such
a disturbance, both the inflation gap and the output gap should be allowed to vary,
each in order to reduce the amount of adjustment that is required by the other.
The dynamic criterion differs from the Norges Bank criterion, however, in that
it implies that if inflation is allowed to increase, and the output gap to decrease, in
response to a positive cost-push shock, a below-target inflation rate should subse-
quently be aimed at, as the output gap returns to its normal level (since the output
gap is then increasing), rather than continuing to aim at an inflation rate above tar-
get (because the output gap remains negative, albeit to a decreasing extent). If the
dynamic response is credible, an expectation of subsequent disinflation should reduce
incentives for wage and price increases during the period of the cost-push shock, at
any given level of economic activity, and so should shift the short-run Phillips curve
tradeoff in a way that tends to offset some of the effects of a cost-push shock. This
allows a superior degree of achievement of the stabilization objectives than would be
possible under the Norges Bank criterion.
An alternative way of seeing the difference between the two target criteria is to
16Svensson and Woodford (2005) extend this analysis to an arguably more realistic model in which
monetary policy changes can affect inflation and output only with a one-period lag, and show that a
target criterion of the same form continues to characterize optimal policy, except that the criterion
must be projected to hold only at horizons one period or farther in the future.
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note that the dynamic criterion can alternatively be expressed in a level form, as a
requirement that the condition
pt + φxt = p
∗
t , (1.10)
be projected to be satisfied at all future horizons, where pt is the log of the general
price, and p∗t is a deterministic target path for the log price level, growing at a constant
rate π∗ each period. Satisfaction of (1.10) each period would imply that
πt + φ(xt − xt−1) = π∗ (1.11)
each period, and vice versa, assuming that the initial level p∗−1 for the target path is
chosen so that (1.10) is satisfied by the (historically given) data for the period just
before the first period in which either of the target criteria will be enforced.
But (1.10) and (1.11) are only equivalent under the assumption that either target
criterion can be precisely satisfied by the realized values of inflation and the output
gap each period. Under the more realistic assumption that target misses of some size
will constantly occur, even if the target criterion is projected at each decision point
to be satisfied in all future periods. That is, the requirement that a central bank’s
projections satisfy
[(πt+h − π∗) + φ(xt+h − xt+h−1)],t = 0 (1.12)
for all horizons h ≥ 0 at each decision point t is not equivalent to requiring them to
satisfy
[(pt+h − p∗t+h) + φxt+h],t = 0 (1.13)
each period. In the former case, the target p∗t for the “output-gap adjusted price
level” pt + φxt used in period t is effectively adjusted, relative to the target for the
same variable used in the period t − 1 projection exercise, by an amount equal to
the target miss pt−1 + φxt−1 − p∗t−1 in the previous period; in the latter case, instead,
the target path {p∗t} remains predetermined. Thus the “level” version of the target
criterion incorporates a commitment to subsequent correction of past target misses,
while the first-differenced (or “growth-rate”) version does not.
Such a commitment to error-correction increases the robustness of the forecast-
targeting procedure to errors of judgment on the part of the central bank.17 There
is less reason to worry that a sustained departure of the actual inflation rate from
17See Woodford (2011, 2012a) for further discussion of this issue.
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the target rate can occur, simply as a result of a persistent bias in the central bank’s
inflation forecast, that allows it to project at each decision point that (1.11) will be
satisfied, though in fact the output-gap-adjusted inflation rate (i.e., the left-hand side
of (1.11)) exceeds π∗ each period. Under the level version of the target criterion, a
positive overshoot in one period requires the central bank to aim for an output-gap-
adjusted inflation rate in subsequent periods that is less than π∗, and subsequent
overshooting in the same direction (resulting from a systematic bias in the central
bank’s projections) will further increase the size of the correction that is called for.
Eventually, the central bank will be required to aim at a value of the gap-adjusted
inflation rate that is sufficiently far below π∗ that the actual outcome will not exceed
π∗ on average, even given the bias in the central bank’s projections.18
Hence continuing excess inflation will not result, even if the bias in the central
bank’s projections is never recognized and corrected by adjustment of the forecasting
model. And even assuming eventual learning on the part of the central bank, the
losses that result while the learning takes place are reduced in the case of a forecast-
targeting exercise using criterion (1.10) rather than (1.11), as shown in a quantitative
example by Aoki and Nikolov (2005).19
18Svensson (2012) argues for the importance of adopting procedures that can ensure that the
actual outcome will not differ substantially from the target rate when averaged over a sufficient
number of years, and discusses commitment to a level target (a price level target, in his case) as one
way of achieving it. He also suggests, however, that “a less dramatic change” would be to target
a five- to ten-year moving average of inflation, as proposed by Nessen and Vestin (2005). Because
of the desirability of adopting an intermediate target criterion to determine short-term policy that
involves real activity as well as inflation, one might alternatively wish to target a moving average of
the gap-adjusted inflation rate, or (for the sake of a simpler proposal) a moving average of nominal
GDP growth. Proposals of this kind have similar virtues as a level target, as long as the moving
average is not too short, though I believe that a level target would be simpler both to implement
and to explain.
19One possible source of bias in the central bank’s projections is mis-estimation of the natural
rate of output, and hence of the output gap, which, as Orphanides (2003) shows from historical
experience, might well persist for years. A target criterion that ties the acceptable level of inflation
to the growth rate of the output gap, rather than its level — (1.11) as opposed to (1.9) — already
reduces the risk that persistent inflation can be generated from a persistent bias in the central
bank’s estimate of the output gap, as Orphanides discusses (in arguing for a variant Taylor rule
that responds to inflation and the growth of the output gap, rather than inflation and the level of
the output gap, as proposed by Taylor, 1993). But the level version of the target criterion reduces
the possibility of a substantial unplanned cumulative increase in the price level still further. On
19
A level version of the target criterion is also more robust to the occurrence of
target misses owing to factors outside of the central bank’s control, as opposed to
errors in the central bank’s forecasts. These include the fact that, inevitably, the
central bank must choose its instrument setting without full information about the
values of the current structural disturbances, so that even if the criterion is (correctly)
projected to hold, conditional on the information available to the monetary policy
committee at the time of its decision, the actual values of the structural disturbances
not exactly known to the committee will almost certainly result in its not holding ex-
actly. Woodford (2011) discusses how to characterize an optimal policy commitment
under such an informational constraint, and shows that it involves a commitment to
error-correction of the same sign as automatically occurs under a level criterion such
as (1.10).20 The same result applies when the failure to achieve the target criterion
results from a constraint on the degree to which the policy instrument can currently
be moved, rather than a lack of more precise information about how it should be
set. Hence there are substantial advantages to the level version of the target criterion
when the central bank is constrained by an effective lower bound on the level of its
policy rate, as discussed in section 2.
The numerical value of the coefficient φ in the target criterion (1.10) that is best
depends on the relative importance assigned to inflation stabilization and output-gap
stabilization respectively.21 In the case that φ = 1, the proposed target criterion has




where Yt ≡ pt + yt is the log of nominal GDP (if yt is the log of real GDP), and the
the advantages of a level target in minimizing the effects of mis-estimation of the output gap, see
Gorodnichenko and Shapiro (2006).
20The optimal commitment actually involves a slightly stronger degree of error-correction than
the level criterion prescribes; when imperfect information results in a gap-adjusted inflation rate
higher than π∗, the subsequent target should be reduced by an amount slightly greater than the size
of the target overshoot, though the multiplicative factor approaches 1 as the rate of time discounting
in the central bank’s stabilization objective approaches zero. Even allowing for discounting, error-
correction of the kind prescribed by the level version of the full-information optimal target criterion
is clearly desirable relative to the criterion with no such correction at all.
21Woodford (2003, 2011) shows how the optimal coefficient depends both on the coefficients of
the policymaker’s loss function and the slope of the Phillips-curve tradeoff.
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target Y ∗t is given by
Y ∗t = y
n
t + π
∗ · t, (1.15)
where ynt is the log of the natural rate of output (so that the output gap is defined as
xt ≡ yt − ynt ). In this case, the target criterion can be expressed as a target path for
the level of nominal GDP, a concept that is easier to explain than a target path for the
output-gap-adjusted price level. Setting the coefficient φ equal to 1 might be viewed
as representing a “balanced approach” to the dual goals of inflation and output-gap
stabilization, and avoids the need to justify using a particular numerical value in the
criterion (1.10). Hence this particular form of intermediate target criterion is likely
to be an especially practical way of achieving the general objectives discussed above.
2 Forward Guidance at the Interest-Rate Lower
Bound
Thus far I have discussed reasons for a central bank to be explicit about its intended
future conduct of policy — both in its internal deliberations and in its explanations of
its policy decisions to the public — as a routine element of the conduct of monetary
policy. But there are special reasons for explicit discussion of future policy in the
case that a central bank reaches the effective lower bound for its policy rate, as has
occurred for a number of central banks since the fall of 2008.22 It is no accident that
these circumstances have resulted in increased interest in explicit forward guidance
as a policy tool.
There are two main advantages for a central bank from talking explicitly about
its future policy, rather than simply allowing the public to form its own expectations
about policy on the basis of observed behavior. First of all, in the absence of ex-
planations by the central bank itself, misunderstandings of its policy intentions may
easily develop, and this should not be left to chance, since uncertainty about how
22In some cases, like those of the U.S. Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the Bank
of Japan, banks have kept their policy rates at levels that they have regarded as lower bounds
continuously since late 2008 or early 2009, without achieving a degree of expansion of aggregate
sufficient for full utilization of productive capacity, so that the question whether forward guidance
can provide further stimulus continues to be relevant. In other cases, like those of the Bank of
Canada and Sveriges Riksbank, effective lower bounds were reached in the first half of 2009, but the
constraint remained relevant only during 2009-10.
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policy will be interpreted implies uncertainty about the effects of the policy. Ex-
plicit explanations of policy are most likely to be needed in unusual circumstances,
or when a central bank intends to act in ways that could not easily be predicted from
its previous behavior.
Hence it is not surprising that explicit forward guidance by central banks has
increased precisely in a period when unprecedented policy actions are being taken,
so that past rules of thumb are no longer adequate predictors of behavior. At the
same time, a situation in which the current policy rate is constrained by floor on
the level of short-term rates that the central bank is willing to contemplate23 is also
one in which expectational errors should be particularly costly. For one reason, the
social cost of an expectational error that makes aggregate demand lower by a given
number of percentage points (because of a mistaken expectation that future policy
will be tighter than a correct forecast would have indicated) is greater, the greater
the extent to which demand already falls short of the efficient level of activity. If a
binding interest-rate lower bound results in a larger negative output gap than would
be allowed to exist otherwise (since further interest-rate cuts would otherwise occur
and reduce the gap), this is reason to be particularly concerned to minimize potential
expectational errors at such a time.
In addition, in a situation where the policy rate is expected to remain fixed for
23The “effective lower bound” to which I refer here is not necessarily a technical constraint on
the level of overnight interest rates that could be achieved. None of the central banks that I have
described as constrained by their self-imposed lower bounds have actually reduced their targets for
their policy rates all the way to zero, the rate of return on currency. (Some would question whether
even zero is a genuine lower bound for overnight interest rates, given the existence of at least modest
holding costs for currency.) The Federal Reserve has maintained an official target band between
zero and 25 basis points for the federal funds rate, and has continued to pay 25 basis points of
interest on reserves held overnight at the Fed, so that the funds rate has continued to trade ten
basis points or more above zero. The Bank of Canada and Sveriges Riksbank never reduced their
policy rates below 25 basis points. Nonetheless, all of these banks held their policy rates fixed at
these floors for extended periods, and, as discussed below, announced an intention to keep them
there as a substitute for a further immediate interest-rate cut. In other words, the floors were
treated as lower bounds on the targets for the policy rate that would be considered, even if the
constraints were prudential rather than technical in nature. The most commonly offered reason for
not considering a further immediate cut in the policy rate has been concern for the consequences
for private financial intermediaries of a complete elimination of any spread between the return on
currency and money-market interest rates.
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a substantial period (because the interest-rate lower bound is expected to continue
to bind), but the question is whether people have correct expectations about what
will happen after that period, New Keynesian models typically imply that changes
in expectations about what will happen after the several quarters of constant pol-
icy rate will have larger consequences for near-term aggregate demand and economic
activity than if policy were expected to be conducted over that period in a “stan-
dard” way — in accordance with the Taylor rule, or with the reaction function of an
inflation-targeting central bank under normal conditions — so that the policy rate
would vary with economic activity and with inflation. If increased pessimism about
future output or inflation does not lead to anticipated declines in the policy rate,
owing to the expectation that the policy rate will already be at its lower bound, the
resulting contraction in current demand — and hence the reduction in current out-
put, employment and inflation — will be greater. Furthermore, to the extent that
this mechanism is expected to result in lower output and inflation at future dates
in the period when the lower bound still binds, such an expectation should produce
even lower output and inflation, through a self-amplifying process.
Hence output and inflation in a period when the lower bound is a binding con-
straint should be particularly sensitive to changes in expectations about macroeco-
nomic conditions once the lower bound no longer prevents the central bank from
achieving its normal stabilization objectives.24 This explains the fact that in the
numerical example of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), even a commitment to a
modestly expansionary policy after it would become possible to achieve the central
bank’s normal objectives has a dramatic effect on the severity of the output collapse
and deflation that are predicted in the period when the interest-rate lower bound is
24The reason for this is closely related to the observation above that New Keynesian models
commonly imply that a commitment to a fixed nominal interest rate forever results in indeterminacy
of equilibrium. Mathematically, this indeterminacy reflects the fact that when the nominal interest
rate is fixed and assumed not to vary with changes in output or inflation, the mapping from expected
future macroeconomic conditions into current conditions has an eigenvalue greater than one, so that
the deviation from steady-state values that must be expected a period in the future in order to
generate a given size deviation from steady-state values now is smaller in magnitude than the
current deviation that is produced. If the constant nominal interest rate is extended indefinitely
into the future, this makes it possible for bounded departures from the steady-state values to be
purely self-fulfilling. But even if the constant nominal interest rate lasts for only a finite time, the
same result implies that small changes in expectations about conditions later can generate larger
changes in current conditions.
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binding.
A second reason why forward guidance may be needed — that again has partic-
ular force when the interest-rate lower bound is reached — is in order to facilitate
commitment on the part of the central bank. As Krugman (1998) emphasizes using
a simple two-period model, and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) show in the con-
text of a more fully articulated dynamic model, the future policy that one wishes for
people to anticipate is one that the central bank will not have a motive to implement
later, if it makes its decisions then in a purely forward-looking way, on the basis of
its usual stabilization objectives. Hence a desirable outcome requires commitment,
just as in the analysis of Kydland and Prescott (1977) — even though in this case,
the problem is a lack of motive ex post to be as expansionary as one wanted people
earlier to expect, rather than a lack of motive ex post to control inflation as tightly as
one wanted them to expect. In practice, the most logical way to make such commit-
ment achievable and credible is by publicly stating the commitment, in a way that is
sufficiently unambiguous to make it embarrassing for policymakers to simply ignore
the existence of the commitment when making decisions at a later time.
These considerations establish a straightforward case for the benefits that should
be attainable, at least in principle, from the right kind of advance discussion of
future policy intentions. On the other hand, some caution is appropriate as to the
conditions under which such an approach should be expected to work. It does not
make sense to suppose that merely expressing the view of the economy’s future path
that the central bank would currently wish for people to believe will automatically
make them believe it. If speech were enough, without any demonstrable intention to
act differently as well, this would be magic indeed — for it would allow the central
bank to stimulate greater spending while constrained by the interest-rate lower bound,
by telling people that they should expect expansionary policy later, and then also
fully achieve its subsequent stabilization objectives, by behaving in a way that is
appropriate to conditions at the time and paying no attention to past forecasts. But
there would be no reason for people believe central-bank speech offered in that spirit.
Hence it is important, under such an approach to policy, that the central bank
not merely give thought to the future course of conduct that it would like for people
to anticipate, and offer this is as a forecast that it would like them to believe. It must
also think about how it intends to approach policy decisions in the future, so that the
policy that it wants people to anticipate will actually be put into effect, and about
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how the fact that this history-dependent approach to policy has been institutionalized
can be made visible to people outside its own building. These matters are not simple
ones, and require considerable attention to the way the central bank communicates
about its objectives, procedures and decisions. The problem is all the more difficult
when one must communicate about how an unprecedented situation will be dealt
with.
2.1 Date-Based Forward Guidance During the Recent Crisis
As mentioned above, the global financial crisis that reached its most intense phase
after the fall of 2008 resulted in many central banks slashing their policy rates to their
effective lower bounds by early in 2009 (if not even sooner); yet economic activity
remained far below potential and unemployment surged. The desire to provide further
stimulus to aggregate demand other than through further cuts in the policy rate led
to experimentation with a variety of types of “unconventional” policies, including
unprecedented uses of explicit forward guidance. In particular, several central banks
made statements indicating that they expected to maintain a fixed policy rate for a
specific period of time.
A particularly explicit example of forward guidance was the Bank of Canada’s
statement on April 21, 2009, which announced the following:
The Bank of Canada today announced that it is lowering its target for
the overnight rate by one-quarter of a percentage point to 1/4 per cent,
which the Bank judges to be the effective lower bound for that rate....
With monetary policy now operating at the effective lower bound for
the overnight policy rate, it is appropriate to provide more explicit
guidance than is usual regarding its future path so as to influence rates
at longer maturities. Conditional on the outlook for inflation, the target
overnight rate can be expected to remain at its current level until the
end of the second quarter of 2010 in order to achieve the inflation target.
While the statement included the announcement of a reduction in the current target
rate, it also offered explicit guidance about where the target should be expected to
be, extending more than a year into the future. The release of the statement had
an almost instantaneous effect on market expectations about the future path of the
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Figure 2: Intraday OIS rates in Canada on April 21, 2009. The dotted vertical line
indicates the time of release of the Bank of Canada’s announcement of its “conditional
commitment” to maintain its policy rate target at 25 basis points through the end of
the second quarter of 2010. Source: Bloomberg.
policy rate, as indicated by trading in overnight interest-rate swap (OIS) contracts
(Figure 2).
The tick-by-tick transactions data plotted in the figure show that market OIS
rates fell almost instantaneously at the time that the announcement was made (9:00
AM EST, shown by the vertical line). This was evidently an effect of the statement;
yet since the statement included the announcement of an immediate target rate re-
duction, one might wonder if the moves in the OIS rates reflected simply the typical
implications of a cut in the current target for rates months in the future, rather than
any additional effects of the “conditional commitment.” It is useful to note not only
that OIS rates for maturities as long as six to twelve months fall, but that the longer
maturities fall more; that is, not only does the OIS yield curve fall in response to the
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Figure 3: The forward rate (for the period between 6 and 12 months in the future)
implied by the term structure of OIS rates (see text for explanation), for both the
Canadian dollar and the US dollar, over the course of 2009. The dotted vertical line
marks the date of the announcement of the Bank of Canada’s “conditional commit-
ment.” Daily data. Source: Bloomberg.
for months in early 2010 fall even more than do nearer-term expectations, or that
uncertainty about the path of the policy rate over the coming year has been sub-
stantially reduced (reducing the term premium). Either of these interpretations is a
plausible consequence of the Bank’s unprecedented (albeit conditional) commitment
to a particular value for the policy rate over the coming year, on the assumption that
it is (at least partially) believed; neither would be expected to follow from a simple
announcement of a cut in the current policy rate, which would typically steepen the
yield curve.
The apparent effect on expected future interest rates persisted for at least several
weeks following this announcement. Figure 3 plots the path over the course of 2009
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of a forward rate f
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t is the n-month OIS rate. If the n-month OIS rate is interpreted as a
market forecast of the average overnight policy rate over the next n months,25 then
f
(t+6,12)
t would correspond to the market forecast of the average policy rate over a
time window between 6 and 12 months in the future. The figure shows that this
forward rate falls by 10 to 15 basis points on the date of the announcement (shown
by the vertical line), and also that it remains at roughly its new level for the next
several weeks. Moreover, there is no similar decline in the corresponding US forward
rate during those weeks (as Chehal and Trehan, 2009, also note); this suggests that
changed expectations about future Bank of Canada policy, rather than news about
the economic outlook (which is typically highly correlated with the outlook for the
US) are responsible.
This seems a fairly clear example of interest-rate expectations being changed by
explicit forward guidance from a central bank. It should not surprise one that the
clearest such evidence occurs in the case where a central bank most clearly indi-
cated its intention to provide such guidance — both referring to its statement as
having made a “conditional commitment”26 rather than simply offering a forecast,
and stating its intention to “provide more explicit guidance” in order to “influence
[longer-term] rates.” Yet even in this case, market beliefs do not simply come to
accept that the announced path for the policy rate will be followed with certainty.
One observes in Figure 2 that while the OIS rates for maturities between 6 and 12
months all fall, the rates for 10 and 12-month maturities do not fall all the way to
25 basis points, even though the announced path involves a policy rate of 25 basis
points extending more than 12 months into the future.
One might say that this means that the Bank’s commitment is not completely
credible. Actually, the Bank did not purport to make an ironclad commitment; it
consistently refers to having made a “conditional commitment,” and the condition-
ality on “the inflation outlook” is clear in the part of the statement quoted above. It
appears that, at the time of the announcement, the escape clause was not expected
25This is an over-simplification, as it neglects the consequences of interest-rate risk over that
horizon.
26The word “commitment” is used in the title of the press release, as well as in the text.
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to be invoked with any very great probability within the coming six months, but that
a somewhat higher chance of a rise in inflation triggering early termination of the
commitment was allowed for over the 12-month horizon.
One also observes from Figure 3 that, during the first week of June the forward
rate shot up again, to a level greater than 50 basis points (and higher than in the
period before the “conditional commitment”). Since at this point in time, the period
to which the commitment applied still included all of the next 12 months, one can only
conclude that markets had developed more serious doubts about whether the policy
rate would really remain at the floor through June 2010. These seem to have resulted
from developments in the US; the figure also shows that the corresponding US forward
rate shot up by an even larger amount. The spike in US OIS rates occurred on June
5, 2009, in response to a better-than-expected US Department of Labor report that
“raised hopes” that the US economy was “on the road to recovery,” according to the
Financial Times (Guha et al., 2009), and resulted in “the futures market pricing in
at least one rate increase by the Fed by the end of the year,” despite protests by
Fed officials that such talk was premature. Traders in Canadian dollar OIS contracts
were evidently either skeptical that the Bank of Canada would fail to follow such
a move by the Fed, or expected that rapid improvement in the US economy would
bring similar consequences for the Canadian economy, and hence a change in the
outlook for Canadian inflation. In the latter case, they did not necessarily disbelieve
the conditional commitment; but it became less the determinant of their interest-rate
expectations, as the likelihood of the relevance of the escape clause increased.
The subsequent experiments of the Federal Reserve with announcements that the
federal funds rate was expected to remain at its current floor for a stated period of time
similarly had measurable effects on market expectations of the future path of the funds
rate, as illustrated for example by OIS rates. As is discussed further in a later section,
these statements by the FOMC had less of the character of an announcement of a
policy intention than was true of the Bank of Canada’s “conditional commitment”;
instead, the FOMC was careful only to offer a forecast of what is most likely to occur,
given its current information. Nonetheless, these statements as well did seem to move
market expectations.
The FOMC began using forward guidance as soon as its effective lower bound
for the funds rate target was reached. In its post-meeting statement released on
December 16, 2008, it announced that the funds rate target was being cut to what has
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thus far been its lower bound, namely a band between zero and 25 basis points (with
interest being paid on reserves at a rate of 25 basis points); but the same statement
announced that this level of the target was expected to be maintained “for some time.”
In its statement of March 18, 2009, this declaration was strengthened (without any
change in the target band), to state that conditions were likely to warrant a low
funds rate “for an extended period.” (These indications, not specifying an exact time
period, were similar in style to the FOMC’s reference, beginning in August 2003, to
maintaining accommodation “for a considerable period,” as an alternative to further
cuts in the current funds rate target.27) A more aggressive form of forward guidance
was first adopted in the statement of August 9, 2011, in which the main news was the
line: “The Committee currently anticipates that economic conditions ... are likely to
warrant exceptionally low levels of the federal funds rate at least through mid-2013.”
The forward guidance was further strengthened in the statement released on January
25, 2012, to say “... at least through late 2014.” On September 13, 2012, the date
was moved back to “at least through mid-2015,” in addition to other changes in the
forward guidance that are discussed further below.
The cleanest tests of the effects of forward guidance are provided by the August
2011 and January 2012 statement releases; not only did these statements both include
very precise specifications of a future funds rate path quite far into the future — that
in each case made a stronger statement than the Committee had previously been
willing to make, and came as something of a surprise — but in these cases, unlike
the first two, the statement did not also contain important policy changes of any
other sort at the same time.28 Figures 4 and 5 show intraday data for US dollar OIS
contracts, on the days that these two statements were released. In each case, there
is a clear, immediate effect on expectations of the future path of the funds rate: OIS
rates fall, despite the fact that the current funds rate target remained unchanged.
27See Woodford (2005) for discussion of this earlier episode.
28The statement on December 16, 2008 had, among other things, announced a substantial cut
in the current funds rate target; abandoned the FOMC’s previous practice of announcing a point
target, in favor of a band; and announced that the Fed would “purchase large quantities of agency
debt and mortgage-backed securities.” The statement on March 18, 2009, had not announced any
change in the funds rate target, but specified the amounts of various types of long-term securities
that would be purchased. The statement on September 13, 2012 also announced a new, open-ended
program of purchases of mortgage-backed securities, and this aspect of the statement attracted the
greatest attention in the financial press.
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Figure 4: Intraday US dollar OIS rates on August 9, 2011. The dotted vertical line
indicates the time of release of the FOMC statement indicating an expectation that
the funds rate target would remain unchanged “at least through mid-2013.” Source:
Bloomberg.
Moreover, there is a clear flattening of the OIS yield curve in each case. In Figure
4, the 6-month OIS rate is essentially unaffected (it continues to trade in the area
of 9 basis points); this makes sense, given that the FOMC had already indicated
that its existing target (which had resulted in a funds rate a little below 10 basis
points) should be maintained “for an extended period” (evidently taken to mean
at least 6 months). Longer-term OIS rates (especially the 18-month and two-year
rates) immediately fall, however, to levels barely above 10 basis points; this is what
one would expect if market participants believed that the FOMC would with high
probability maintain its current target for two years into the future. In Figure 5,
the one-year OIS rate (now trading just above 10 basis points) is barely affected; this
makes sense, given that the FOMC’s existing forward guidance already extended more
than a year into the future (“at least through mid-2013”). The two-year, three-year,
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Figure 5: Intraday US dollar OIS rates on January 25, 2012. The dotted vertical line
indicates the time of release of the FOMC statement indicating an expectation that
the funds rate target would remain unchanged “at least through late 2014.” Source:
Bloomberg.
and five-year rates instead immediately decline; these contracts all relate to periods
that were not completely covered by the already existing forward guidance, so that
the extension of the horizon through late 2014 should have mattered, if believed, for
the pricing of these contracts.
It is true that in Figure 5, the two-year and three-year OIS do not fall all the way
to the level of the one-year rate,29 despite the fact that the FOMC now announced
that it anticipated maintaining its target unchanged for a period extending nearly
three years into the future. Evidently market participants did not attach a 100
percent probability to maintenance of an unchanged target for that long. But as
in the case of the Bank of Canada’s forward guidance, one cannot really say that
29Note that in the figure, the three-year rate has been shifted down by 10 basis points, in order to
show the several series on a single graph. This contract continues to trade at a rate above 20 basis
points, contrary to how the figure may appear.
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this shows that they did not believe what they were told, for the FOMC did not
commit itself to maintain the target come what may for that period of time; it stated
only that it anticipated conditions that would warrant such behavior. (There is a
clear implication that not all conditions would.) The statement does seem to have
had a definite impact on the expected forward path of the funds rate over a horizon
extending years into the future, despite the fact that it was far from an unconditional
commitment.
Swanson and Williams (2012) provide a variety of other sorts of evidence sug-
gesting that these announcements had substantial effects on market expectations
regarding the future path of interest rates.30 After the FOMC’s introduction of the
“mid-2013” language in August 2011, the median forecast of the length of time that
the funds rate target would remain unchanged in the Blue Chip survey of professional
forecasters jumped from only three to four quarters to seven or more quarters, in ac-
cordance with the new FOMC prediction. Moreover, the market pricing of a variety
of types of financial instruments also changed after this date in a way consistent with
market expectations of a substantially reduced probability of any increase in short-
term interest rates over the next few quarters. For example, Swanson and Williams
find that the probability of the federal funds rate remaining below 50 basis points
several months into the future that could be inferred from daily data on interest-
rate options spiked up, and remained between 80 and 90 percent on most days, after
the introduction of the “mid-2013” language. They also show that Eurodollar fu-
tures prices (for contracts settling several quarters in the future) became much less
sensitive to macroeconomic data releases, consistent with a market belief that the
path of the federal funds rate would be insensitive to macroeconomic conditions; the
sensitivity of longer-horizon contracts to macroeconomic developments was further
reduced after the extension of the date to “late 2014.” Raskin (2013) extends these
results, focusing on the probability distributions for future levels of the federal funds
rate at different horizons implied by interest-rate options. He finds not only that the
implied probability of a future funds rate below 0.5 percent at horizons a year or
more in the future shot up and remained permanently higher after the introduction
of the “mid-2013” language, but also that the sensitivity of the distribution of pos-
sible future funds rates to macroeconomic news decreased with the introduction of
the “mid-2013” language, and again further with the introduction of the “late 2014”
30See also Woodford (2012b) for a more detailed discussion of this evidence than is provided here.
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language.
These results provide fairly clear evidence of substantial changes in market expec-
tations regarding the future evolution of interest rates, in the direction of increased
confidence that short-term rates would remain close to zero for several quarters. Yet
it is difficult — especially in the case of the evidence regarding sensitivity to macroe-
conomic news, which, because of the method used (essentially, observation of how
rolling regression coefficients change over time), cannot localize the changes in beliefs
very precisely in time — to be certain that the change in beliefs should be attributed
to the FOMC’s statements, rather than simply to market participants’ increasing
doubts that conditions would warrant an increase in the funds rate target anytime
soon, as a consequence of other kinds of macroeconomic news. And even to the ex-
tent that one accepts that the timing of the changes in expectations suggests that
the FOMC’s changes in communication policy were an important part of the news,
there remains the question whether what this conveyed was news about the economic
outlook or news about the FOMC’s approach to the conduct of policy. I return to
this issue in section 2.3 below.
2.2 Date-Based Forward Guidance in an Inflation-Forecast
Targeting Regime
The examples given in the previous section indicate that central-bank statements
can influence the interest-rate expectations of market participants, in the case of
central banks (such as the Bank of Canada and the Federal Reserve) that did not
ordinarily offer guidance about the likely future path of their policy rates, outside
of the unusual circumstances associated with reaching the interest-rate lower bound.
But as discussed in section 1, there is a case for the desirability of routinely publishing
the central bank’s projections of the forward path of the policy rate, as part of an
inflation-forecast targeting procedure. If this is done, is there also room for forward
guidance of the more special kind that the Bank of Canada and the Fed have sought
to use, in the case that a bank finds itself constrained by the effective lower bound for
its policy rate? The case of Sveriges Riksbank is of particular interest in this regard.
As noted in section 1, the Riksbank has since February 2007 included in each issue of
itsMonetary Policy Report a projected forward path for the repo rate (the Riksbank’s
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operating target for the overnight rate31), which is the ordinary instrument of policy.
While in this sense the Riksbank had begun to routinely use forward guidance as a
dimension of policy even prior to the global financial crisis, in the aftermath of the
crisis the Riksbank has also announced on more than one occasion that its policy rate
would remain fixed for a specified period of time, as a substitute for a larger immediate
cut in the policy rate — a form of forward guidance with important similarities to
the more ad hoc announcements discussed in the previous section.
In a review of Sweden’s experience, Deputy Governor Lars Svensson (2010) argues
that, through December 2008, the Riksbank had been relatively successful at “man-
aging expectations” through its policy. Often, he notes, market expectations were
already fairly close to the announced forward path for the repo rate [the Riksbank’s
operating target for the overnight rate32] prior to the announcement, which he regards
as an indication that the bank had succeeded in conducting a predictable policy and in
making the systematic character of its policy evident to the public. “When there were
some discrepancies,” he writes, “in most cases the market adjusted its expectations
towards the [announced] policy-rate path after the announcement” (p. 48).
The effects of the Riksbank’s more recent experiments with announcements of
an anticipated duration for the current repo rate have been more mixed. On April
21, 2009 (a few hours before the Bank of Canada announcement discussed above),
the Riksbank announced a cut of the repo rate to 50 basis points, together with a
statement that “the repo rate is expected to remain at a low level until the beginning
of 2011,” a date nearly two years in the future. The statement was accompanied
by the release of a Monetary Policy Update, with a projected forward path which
showed the repo rate at a constant level of 50 basis points through the end of 2010,
as shown in Figure 6.
The figure shows the actual path of the repo rate as a solid black line (a step
function); the projected forward path from April onward that was published on April
31It is called “the repo rate” because at one time the bank’s policy was implemented through
lending at that rate under repurchase agreements, though this is not currently the case. It now
defines the center of a corridor for the overnight rate, 20 basis points in width, maintained by the
Riksbank.
32It is called “the repo rate” because at one time the bank’s policy was implemented through
lending at that rate under repurchase agreements, though this is not currently the case. It now




















Figure 6: Market expectations of the forward path of the repo rate in Sweden, before
and after the Riksbank’s press release on April 21, 2009 that indicated that the repo
rate was “expected to remain at a low level until the beginning of 2011.” Source:
Sveriges Riksbank.
21; the market expected forward path, as inferred by the Riksbank on the basis
of interest-rate forward and swap rates33 the day before the announcement; and
the corresponding market expected forward path after the announcement.34 Market
participants evidently had expected an even larger cut in the repo rate than occurred,
and for the repo rate to remain lower, at least for some months, than was indicated
by the projected path. In response to the announcement, the market expected path
rose, though still remaining lower than the path projected by the Riksbank, for the
first few months after April. By early 2010, market participants had anticipated that
33See Svensson (2010, footnote 7) for more details. The implied forward rates include corrections
for credit risk and maturity premia.
34The figure also shows the Riksbank’s previously announced repo-rate path, from February, so
as to show to what extent the new path represented a change from the bank’s own most recent
forecast.
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Figure 7: Intraday Swedish OIS rates on April 21, 2009. The dotted vertical line
indicates the time of the Riksbank’s press release (9AM in Sweden, or 3AM EST).
Source: Bloomberg.
the repo rate would already be rising above 50 basis points, whereas the Riksbank
projected it to remain at 50 basis points for another year; but in response to the
announcement, the market expected path for 2010 rose still further.
The result is that an announcement that was intended to shift down the antici-
pated forward path of rates, by announcing that a low rate would be maintained until
the beginning of 2011, and so to immediately lower longer-term interest rates, had
exactly the opposite effect: long rates rose, because the entire anticipated forward
path of rates shifted up. What went wrong? While many things happened from one
day to the next — as noted above, the Bank of Canada introduced its own “condi-
tional commitment” six hours after the Riksbank’s announcement — it seems clear
that it was the Riksbank’s announcement that moved market expectations. Figure 7
shows the intraday OIS rates for Sweden on April 21, with the time of the release of
the Monetary Policy Update shown; the entire term structure of OIS rates moved up
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within two hours of the release, and well before any news from North America.
What seems to have happened is that market participants took on board part of
the Riksbank’s forward guidance, and modified their own forecasts to conform more
with it: the projection of a path that never fell below 50 points convinced many that
(contrary to prior expectations) the Riksbank would not cut the repo rate below that
level. This implied an increase in the projected path for the next two quarters. But
since the news, as far as market participants were concerned, was that the Riksbank
was less inclined toward interest-rate cuts than they had supposed, the entire path
was also shifted up.
In fact, the Riksbank’s projected forward path contained two notable features: it
was announced that the repo rate was projected to remain low for nearly two years
into the future, and, quite remarkably relative to prior figures, it was projected to
remain absolutely constant over that time — the only obvious reason for which would
have to have been a decision to treat 50 basis points as the effective lower bound. It
is true that the April Monetary Policy Update contained no announcement that this
was a lower bound; it even referred to “some probability of further cuts in the future.”
But as Svensson (2010) notes, it also emphasized that “the repo rate is now close to its
lower limit,” and stated that “with a repo rate at this level, the traditional monetary
policy has largely reached its lower limit.” Moreover, immediately after admitting
the possibility in principle of further cuts, it cautioned: “But when the repo rate is
at such low levels, one must consider the fact that this could have negative effects
on the functioning of the financial markets.” It is easy enough to see how market
participants could have read such remarks as indicating an intention by the Riksbank
not to reduce the rate below 50 basis points (at least, under any but exceedingly
dire circumstances). Such an announcement would, of course, be precisely the sort
that should most affect market expectations: because it was interpreted as revealing
something not previously known about the central bank’s intentions with regard to
policy, rather than the central bank’s judgments about the economic outlook —
and so, a matter about which the bank could undoubtedly be regarded as the most
knowledgeable authority.35
The Riksbank’s other message — that it expected not to raise the repo rate before
2011 — evidently made less of an impression. One reason might have been an assump-
tion that this reflected the Riksbank’s pessimism about the Swedish economy, and
35Nonetheless, the Riksbank did cut the rate further at its July meeting, as discussed below.
38
market participants might have been more optimistic, and so expected rate increases
to be justified sooner than the bank anticipated. Svensson (2010) argues instead that
survey data on traders’ forecasts of inflation and growth indicate that they were no
more optimistic than the Riksbank, and hence that market participants simply did
not accept the Riksbank’s forecasts about its own future approach to policy.
Why might this have been? It is notable that a large (and persistent) discrepancy
between the forward paths announced by the Riksbank and those expected by market
participants appeared only when the Riksbank began attempting to use projections of
a policy rate that would remain fixed for an unusually long time, as a consequence of
having reached its (self-imposed) lower bound. One may conjecture that the Riksbank
sought, as an alternative to a deeper immediate interest-rate cut, to signal that rates
would be kept low for a longer time than would ordinarily have been expected; and this
supposition about future policy was incorporated into its projections. But this change
in the assumption made about future policy was not credible to market participants,
perhaps because no adequate explanation was given of how policy decisions would be
made in the future. The mere fact that the Riksbank announced that it projected
a low path for the repo rate until 2011 was not enough; market participants needed
to have a view of how the Riksbank would make decisions in the future that would
justify such a path (given their expectations regarding the economy’s evolution), and
evidently they were not provided with one.
Similar problems of credibility seem to have persisted since then. In July 2009,
the Riksbank announced a further cut in the repo rate, to 25 basis points, but now
only indicated that the target was expected to remain at its low level “until autumn
2010.” (This might be considered to vindicate skeptics who had not believed the
April projection of a low rate through the beginning of 2011.) As shown in Figure
8, this announcement did shift down market expectations of the forward path, but
market participants continued to forecast that the repo rate would not remain at that
level past the end of 2009, and expected it to be around 100 basis points by autumn
2010. (In fact, it was only raised to 50 basis points in July 2010 and to 75 basis points
in September.) This apparent failure to credit the Riksbank’s view of the length of
time that the target would remain low made policy effectively tighter (in terms of its
consequences for longer-term interest rates and hence for spending decisions) during
2009 than the Riksbank’s projection assumed it would be.



















Figure 8: Market expectations of the forward path of the repo rate in Sweden, before
and after the Riksbank’s press release on July 2, 2009, announcing an additional cut
in the repo rate, and a shortening of the time that the low target was expected to be
maintained. Source: Sveriges Riksbank.
to diverge from the Riksbank’s announced forward paths, but now in the direction of
anticipating a lower future path for the repo rate than the Riksbank. For example,
Figure 9 shows the market expected forward paths before and after the Riksbank’s
press release on September 7, 2011. In this release, the Riksbank announced that
the repo rate target would remain at 2.0 percent, rather than continuing to increase
as it had previously projected,36 owing to deterioration in global growth prospects.
However, this was referred to as only a decision to “postpone continued increases
somewhat”; the new, lower repo rate path continued to show the repo rate steadily
rising over the next three years. Market expectations prior to the announcement
had instead been for cuts in the repo rate to begin by later in the year and to
36The dashed grey line in the figure shows the repo rate path that had been projected in July,



















Figure 9: Market expectations of the forward path of the repo rate in Sweden, before
and after the Riksbank’s press release on September 7, 2011, announcing a “post-
ponement” of further increases in the rate. Source: Sveriges Riksbank.
continue through 2012; and the Riksbank’s announcement had very little effect on
those expectations, despite the reiteration of the Riksbank’s expectation that the repo
rate would continue on an upward path. In fact, there were no further target increases,
and the timing of the first two target decreases (in December 2011 and February 2012)
essentially followed the path anticipated by the markets back in September.
Svensson (2011) provides a variety of possible reasons for market expectations of a
lower rate path than the one announced by the Riksbank.37 These are all reasons why
expectations about future economic conditions might plausibly have differed from the
Riksbank’s assumptions; for example, he notes that market expectations regarding
the future path of US interest rates indicated lower rates than the path assumed by
the Riksbank in its projections. Under this interpretation, market participants may
37His discussion refers to an earlier stage in the Riksbank’s series of repo rate increases in 2010,
when market expectations consistently failed to extrapolate a series of rate increases continuing to
as high a level as the path projected by the Riksbank.
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have accepted the Riksbank’s forecast of how it would behave if conditions evolved as
it assumed, but doubted that those conditions would be realized. But an alternative
possibility is that market participants did not assign much weight to the Riksbank’s
assertions about its future intentions.38 If so, it is possible that the attempt to use
forward guidance more aggressively after April 2009 resulted in a loss of market
confidence in the informativeness of the Riksbank’s projections.
Why would statements of an apparently similar form by the Bank of Canada and
the Federal Reserve have apparently had effects closer to those that were intended?
A possible explanation is that forward guidance outside the context of routine pre-
dictions about the future path of interest rates is more easily interpreted as revealing
central-bank policy intentions. Information about policy intentions is likely to af-
fect the expectations of market participants more than information about the central
bank’s view of the economic outlook, because the way in which the bank intends
to conduct policy is a matter about which the bank obviously knows more than do
outsiders, no matter how closely they follow economic news. And a statement that is
viewed as expressing a commitment, that by virtue of its having been stated should
at least to some extent constrain future policy decisions, should be most informative
of all.
The Bank of Canada’s “conditional commitment” in April 2009 seems to have been
one of the examples of forward guidance that most clearly changed market expecta-
tions, and this is also the case in which a central bank came closest to committing
itself to a future course of action. The Bank of Canada did not shy away from using
the word “commitment” in its press release, even if this was qualified by the word
“conditional,” and the nature of the conditionality was not fully spelled out. Other
central banks, such as the Federal Reserve, have not gone as far; the FOMC’s state-
ments have referred only to what the Committee currently anticipates that future
conditions will warrant. Yet even in these cases, observers may well have assumed
that the unusual announcement made sense only if interpreted as a commitment, and
indeed a good deal of commentary interpreted the FOMC’s statements this way (and
discussed whether the supposed promise was credible). To the extent that reasons
are given for a commitment to make sense — as in the case of the Bank of Canada’s
38An awareness of divisions within the Executive Board may have contributed to such skepticism.
Deputy Governors Karolina Ekholm and Lars Svensson have repeatedly dissented from the policy
decisions of the majority, in favor of lower repo-rate paths, since July 2010.
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explicit reference to its desire to “influence rates” through “forward guidance” — the
interpretation as a commitment is also more likely.
Releases of central-bank projections of the path of interest rates, in the context of a
more general discussion of the central bank’s forecast of the economy’s evolution over
the next few years, are less susceptible to interpretation as a commitment, or even
as an expression of a definite intention about future policy that has already been
formed. Apart from the fact that the central banks that use this communication
strategy take pains to emphasize in the accompanying text that their projections for
the policy rate are merely forecasts conditional on current information, the format
in which the projections are presented also makes this evident. But to the extent
that such projections are viewed simply as following from the bank’s forecast of the
economy’s evolution, including a forecast of the evolution of the policy rate given
how it is typically adjusted in response to varying economic conditions, then they
provide news that should change other market observers’ forecasts of the future path
of interest rates only to the extent to which they are thought to reflect superior
information about the economic outlook that is available to the central bank. Other
close observers of the economy may or may not believe this is true; and even when
they do believe they can learn something from what the central bank reveals about
its information, their own assessment of the best forecast will in general not put a
weight of 100 percent on the central bank’s forecast.
I have remarked above that the degree to which market participants have regarded
the Riksbank’s projected repo rate path as informative about the likely future path
of the repo rate more than a few months into the future seems to have decreased
since April 2009, when the target reached a level that the Riksbank was reluctant to
go below, and a statement that the target should remain at that rate for a specific
(fairly long) time was offered instead of a sharper immediate reduction. This may
well have been interpreted as a departure from the bank’s previous practice in the
way it produced its projections — but not, evidently, because the bank was now
interpreted as making a commitment that it could be counted upon to fulfill.
A possible reason for the reduced credibility of the longer-horizon projections at
this point is that this was the first occasion on which the announced path reflected
a projection of future policy decisions that were history-dependent to any significant
extent — that is, an assumption about future policy that differed from what one
would expect that policy to be simply on the basis of conditions at the time. The
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reason why it would be desirable for policy to be expected to be history-dependent,
under precisely the circumstances reached by the Riksbank in April 2009, has already
been explained above, in section 1: the anticipation at the time of the binding lower
bound of a lower subsequent repo rate than would be desirable on purely forward-
looking grounds at the later date could have beneficial (stimulative) effects at the
time of the binding constraint, albeit at the cost of less successful stabilization later.
This may well be the sort of calculation that led the Riksbank to choose a repo rate
path that indicated low rates so far into the future as it did. But in the absence
of any intention to actually make policy decisions in a history-dependent way later
— or at any rate, in the absence of an explanation of the procedures that would be
followed in the future, that made it credible that future policy would be made in that
way — there would be no reason for market expectations about the future conduct
of policy to change.
The Riksbank’s official description of its approach to monetary policy states that
“in connection with every monetary policy decision, the Executive Board makes an
assessment of the repo-rate path needed for monetary policy to be well-balanced”
(Sveriges Riksbank, 2010, p. 14). The document goes on to explain the competing
considerations that must be taken into account in such an assessment; there is no
suggestion that the exercise is anything but a purely forward-looking consideration,
repeated afresh in each decision cycle, of which of the feasible forward paths for the
economy from that date onward is most desirable, from the standpoint of a criterion
that involves both the rate of inflation (and its distance from the official inflation
target of 2.0 percent) and the level of real activity. Indeed, it stresses that the
appropriate repo-rate path will be reassessed in each decision cycle, so that “the
interest rate path is a forecast, not a promise” (p. 15).
If the model of the economy used in such an assessment of the possible forward
paths at a given point in time incorporates forward-looking private-sector behavior —
as the Riksbank’s RAMSES model (Adolfson et al., 2007) certainly does — and if the
model is solved under the assumption that the projected forward path of the policy
rate is anticipated by those forward-looking decisionmakers, then it might easily be
concluded that the most desirable forward path at a given point in time is one which
assumes history-dependent policy later. This is particularly likely to be the case
when the current policy rate is constrained at its lower bound. But in such a case,
repetition of the forward-looking exercise at the later date will not result in a decision
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to continue the interest-rate path previously projected, even if there have been no
surprise developments in the meantime; for a forward-looking assessment of “well-
balanced policy” at the later date will take no account of the effects of expected
policy at that date on decisions expected to be taken in the private-sector earlier,
according to the policy projections made at the earlier date.39
A purely forward-looking forecast-targeting exercise of such a kind would accord-
ingly be intertemporally inconsistent, as discussed in section 1. This means that there
would be no reason for market participants to hold the expectations assumed in the
projection exercise, even if they perfectly understand the central bank’s decision pro-
cedure. The problem might be that they understand it too well — that they have
a more accurate forecast of the way that future policy will be made than the one
assumed in the projection exercise.
I do not mean to imply that a time-consistent procedure, that assumes that fu-
ture policy will be determined in a purely forward-looking way, would necessarily be
superior. Such a targeting procedure would be intertemporally consistent, but the
equilibrium implemented will generally be suboptimal, from the standpoint of the
criterion used by the bank itself to rank possible forward paths. In particular, in a
situation where the lower bound on the policy rate becomes a binding constraint, an
inability to commit to a history-dependent policy would mean acceptance of a low-
output trap, and of the fact that interest-rate policy can accomplish nothing more
once the lower bound on the current overnight rate is reached. What is needed in
order to achieve a better outcome, despite a correct understanding of the determi-
nants of future policy on the part of market participants, is for the central bank to
adopt procedures under which it will indeed implement a history-dependent policy,
and then to make its intentions clear to market participants. In fact, it does need to
offer a “promise,” and not merely a “forecast” — though the required form of promise
need not be a commitment to a specific pre-announced path for the policy rate.
39In discussing this pitfall of a forecast-targeting approach to monetary policy, I do not mean
to assert that the approach described is necessarily that of Riksbank. At least some members of
the Riksbank’s Executive Board clearly understand the analytical point made here, and approaches
to forecast targeting that would institutionalize history-dependence are discussed, for example, in
Svensson and Woodford (2005) and Svensson (2005, 2007). It is not clear, however, that current
Riksbank policy institutionalizes history-dependence of this sort, and still less that market partici-
pants have been given a reason to expect this.
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2.3 The Federal Reserve’s “Thresholds” for Withdrawal of
Policy Accommodation
The Federal Reserve’s approach to forward guidance has changed in important re-
spects over the past year. Rather than the simple date-based approach described
in section 2.1, the FOMC’s more recent statements have sought to define the future
economic conditions that should determine when a withdrawal of current unusually
accommodative measures should begin. A first step in this direction occurred with
the FOMC’s statement of September 13, 2012. In addition to extending the date
until which the “exceptionally low” federal funds rate target was anticipated to be
warranted (“at least through mid-2015”), the statement included new language in-
dicating that “if the outlook for the labor market does not improve substantially,”
the Committee would continue its program of MBS purchases, “undertake additional
asset purchases, and employ its other policy tools as appropriate until such improve-
ment is achieved in a context of price stability.”
While referring primarily to the conditions under which asset purchases would
continue or even be increased, this statement indicated for the first time a specific
economic goal that would need to be achieved in order for less aggressively expansion-
ary policies to be appropriate. It also indicated for the first time that “the Committee
expects that a highly accommodative stance of monetary policy will remain appropri-
ate for a considerable time after the economic recovery strengthens.” This sentence
refers more directly to intentions with regard to interest-rate policy, and also men-
tions a condition relating to the state of the real economy in connection with the
timing of the eventual withdrawal of the current highly accommodative policy.
An even more dramatic change in the forward guidance with regard to interest-
rate policy came with the statement released on December 12, 2012, in which the
reference to a particular date until which the federal funds rate target would remain
unchanged was eliminated, in favor of a discussion of the economic conditions under
which it would be appropriate to begin raising it. In addition to again indicating the
expectation that accommodation would “remain appropriate for a considerable time
after ... the economic recovery strengthens,” the FOMC indicated that it “currently
anticipates that [the current] exceptionally low range for the federal funds rate will be
appropriate at least as long as the unemployment rate remains above 6-1/2 percent,
inflation between one and two years ahead is projected to be no more than a half
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percentage point above the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal, and longer-term
inflation expectations continue to be well anchored.” In addition to these neces-
sary conditions for a withdrawal of accommodation, the statement indicated that the
timing would also depend on “other information, including additional measures of
labor market conditions, indicators of inflation pressures and inflation expectations,
and readings on financial developments.” This reference to particular future economic
conditions, and above all the specification of precise quantitative “thresholds” for two
variables (the unemployment rate and the inflation projection), has attracted con-
siderable comment, including the directive mentioned in the introduction, requesting
the Bank of England to conduct a formal assessment of the possible usefulness of
such thresholds within the context of the Bank’s inflation targeting regime.
The FOMC’s move away from date-based forward guidance has much to recom-
mend it. If viewed as an actual commitment not to raise the federal funds rate before
the stated date, regardless of what might happen in the meantime, such a policy
would be far from best — indeed, in the case of a commitment extending two years
or more into the future, it could prove quite reckless. It is important to note that
this is not the type of policy recommended by theoretical accounts of the desirabil-
ity of forward guidance. Campbell et al. (2012) refer to the “late 2014” statement
language introduced in January 2012 as implementing “the policy recommendations
of Eggertsson and Woodford (2003),” but Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) do not
argue for the desirability of a commitment to keep the policy rate at zero for a fixed
period of time. They argue for the desirability of a commitment to conduct policy in
a different way than a discretionary central banker would wish to, ex post, and show
that in their New Keynesian model) the optimal commitment involves keeping the
policy rate at zero for some time after the point at which a forward-looking inflation-
targeting bank (or a bank following a forward-looking “Taylor Rule” would begin to
raise interest rates. But the date T until which the policy rate should be kept at
zero is not a date that can be announced with certainty at the time of the shock that
causes the zero lower bound to bind; its optimal value depends on how the economy
develops.40
40In their paper, they illustrate numerically how it should depend on the length of time for which
the natural rate of interest remains abnormally low; and they give a more general analytical char-
acterization of the optimal policy commitment that implies that T should depend on the evolution
of cost-push disturbances as well.
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The reason for this is simple: the interest rate that will be optimal, simply from the
standpoint of its suitability to the conditions that have arisen ex post, will generally
be state-contingent. An optimal commitment will generally specify a different policy
than this, in order to take account of the effects of the anticipation of policy at earlier
dates. But, at least to a first approximation, the latter effects depend only on the
average level of interest rates that are expected at the later date, averaging over all
of the various situations that might arise; so this consideration makes little change in
the way in which it is desirable for interest-rate policy to differ across states at the
later date.
In fact, the FOMC’s date-based forward guidance was never expressed as a com-
mitment in any event; the Committee was careful only to offer statements about
what it “currently anticipate[d]” — and indeed, not what it anticipated about future
policy decisions, but only what it anticipated that future “economic conditions [were]
likely to warrant.” Thus it offered only its own predictions of what was coming, with
no indication that this represented a decision to behave in a different way.41 It was
thus always possible to interpret the FOMC’s announcements about future policy as
simply reflecting changes in the Committee’s view of likely future economic condi-
tions, and hence the path of the funds rate that could be expected under their normal
reaction function. For example, when the FOMC announced in January 2012 that
“the Committee ... currently anticipates that economic conditions ... are likely to
warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through late 2014,”
the headline of the New York Times online story about the announcement was “Fed
Signals That a Full Recovery Is Years Away” (New York Times, 2012).
But if an announcement that the date T at which the policy rate will first rise
above its lower bound has moved farther into the future is interpreted as meaning that
the first date at which a standard (purely forward-looking) Taylor Rule would require
a policy rate above the floor has moved farther into the future because of a weakening
of the economic outlook — without in any way challenging the expectation that the
bank will, as always, follow such a rule — then the announcement (if also believed)
should have a contractionary effect on aggregate demand, rather than an expansionary
one. For rather than implying that, at a certain point in the future, interest rates will
41This was even more obviously true of the forward guidance provided by the FOMC’s decision
to begin including information about individual committee members’ forecasts of the future federal
funds rate in the quarterly Survey of Economic Projections.
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be held lower than one would have expected prior to the announcement (so that real
incomes at that time will be greater than would previously have been expected, and
likely inflation as well), the announcement would instead imply that real incomes at
that time will be lower than would previously have been expected (and likely inflation
as well) — which change in anticipations should reduce current willingness to spend
rather than increasing it. Forward guidance of this kind would have a perverse effect,
and be worse that not commenting on the outlook for future interest rates at all.
The only way to avoid this pitfall is to accompany any discussion of the forward
path of interest rates with an explanation of the considerations behind it — in partic-
ular, of the policy commitments that the anticipated forward path reflects. Discussion
of the forward path of interest rates implied by a central bank’s policy commitments
may well be useful, as discussed in section 1. But this does not mean that presen-
tation of the implied forward path for interest rates suffices as an explanation of the
bank’s policy commitments.
The new form of forward guidance used in the FOMC’s statements since Septem-
ber 2012 represents an important step in this direction, by providing information
about the economic conditions that will need to be observed in order for the removal
of policy accommodation to begin. A discussion cast in these terms is more likely
to be understood as a commitment, and not a mere forecast of future conditions,
and also represents a more reasonable form of commitment to make. In addition,
the explicit statement in September that low rates would “remain appropriate for
a considerable time after ... the economic recovery strengthens” sought to counter
the interpretation that moving the anticipated “lift-off” date back to “mid-2015”
represented merely increased pessimism about the timing of the recovery, and also
provided, for the first time, at least an oblique indication of a decision to behave
differently than the Committee’s usual reaction function would have dictated. The
more specific quantitative criteria included in the December 2012 statement, together
with the abandonment of any reference to a particular “lift-off” date, made both the
state-contingency of the new guidance, and the extent to which it represented a shift
in the reaction function relative to previous policy, even more evident.
Because of the wide attention that this development has received, it is worth com-
menting on the general desirability of the particular formulation chosen by the FOMC
for its new form of forward guidance. The reference to a quantitative “threshold” for
the unemployment rate is the feature that has attracted the greatest comment, with
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some presenting this as a repudiation of an inflation-targeting approach. But I do
not believe that reference to an explicit quantitative target that involves the real
economy, as opposed to one that refers only to the path of some general price index,
should be viewed as incompatible with inflation targeting.
As discussed in section 1, the specification of a definite (and non-time-varying)
medium-run target for inflation does not in itself suffice to determine how short-run
policy decisions should be made, or how they should be expected to be made in various
future contingencies; and in my view, a fully-specified inflation forecast-targeting
procedure — one that actually makes it possible for the central bank to publicly
justify its policy decisions by explaining how they are dictated by its policy targets
— requires the medium-run inflation target to be supplemented by an intermediate
target criterion to determine the short-run policy decision at each decision point.
Given an objective for policy that takes into account real stabilization goals alongside
the goal of inflation stabilization,42 and the fact that a tradeoff between inflation and
real activity does exist in the short run, a desirable intermediate target criterion will
involve some measure of real activity or employment, rather than being a function
of inflation or a price index alone. The “output-gap-adjusted price level target”
proposed by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) provides an example; the nominal
GDP level target path proposed by Woodford (2012b) is another.
A commitment to an intermediate target criterion other than a pure inflation tar-
get need not undermine the credibility of a central bank’s claim to conduct policy so
as to ensure a definite (and unchanging) medium-run rate of inflation. The interme-
diate target criterion can (and in my view should) be chosen so as to imply a definite
long-run rate of inflation, equal to the inflation target, and should furthermore imply
that inflation should be expected to return to the vicinity of the target over the span
of a few quarters except under highly unusual circumstances. A target criterion of
the form (1.10), for example, where the target path p∗t grows linearly at the rate π
∗
(the constant inflation target), has the property that if (1.10) is expected to hold at
all times, then the fact that the output gap is not expected to be different from zero
42Most inflation targeting central banks are clearly expected to take such additional objectives
into account, even if they have not been spelled out as precisely as the inflation target has been. In
the case of the Federal Reserve, the fact that the goal of “maximum employment” is assigned the
same status as “price stability” in the Federal Reserve Account makes it even clearer that concern
for the real economy is appropriate under the form of flexible inflation targeting practiced by the
Fed.
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on average in the long run, independently of monetary policy, will necessarily imply
that in the long run, the log price index pt should also be expected to grow at the
rate π∗. (Even supposing, more realistically, that the central bank will not be able to
ensure that (1.10) holds exactly at all times, the conclusion will still follow as long as
it is understood that the central bank is committed to prevent discrepancies between
the left and right-hand sides of (1.10) from persisting for too long a time.)
As noted above, a nominal GDP level path target, defined by (1.15), is just a
special case of this; hence the same argument applies to a target criterion of this latter
form. Moreover, even if the term ynt in (1.15) is replaced by some other estimate of the
potential output trend, as long as the discrepancy between the estimate of potential
that is implicit in the NGDP target path will not differ from the actual natural rate
of output by an amount that is allowed to grow cumulatively over the long run,
commitment to the NGDP target path should imply that the long-run inflation rate
will necessarily equal π∗.
The kind of thresholds announced by the FOMC are not obviously inconsistent
with with the Fed’s long run inflation target (announced in January 2012, and reaf-
firmed in January 2013), either. First, the announced thresholds are meant to deter-
mine policy only until “liftoff” from the current near-zero level of the federal funds
rate occurs; they do not specify how interest-rate decisions will be made thereafter,
and so are consistent with an expectation that policy thereafter will be conducted
in a way that ensures an average inflation rate of 2 percent per year. Second, even
the specification of the economic conditions required to consider raising the funds
rate target refers explicitly to “the Committee’s 2 percent longer-run goal” for infla-
tion, and indicates that rates could be raised (even with unemployment still above
6-1/2 percent) if inflation is projected to be too far above that rate (or if inflation
expectations are too far out of line with the target).
Nonetheless, the kind of thresholds adopted allow more grounds for doubt about
the FOMC’s long-run policy intentions than was necessary. First, the short-run policy
regime that has been announced appears to represent a break from the guidelines used
to make decisions about interest-rate policy in the recent past; but the fact that the
reaction function can evidently suddenly change — with no need to justify the new
rule as following from the same principles as had underlain past policy, but applied
in a different situation than those confronted in the past — might reasonably create
doubts about how suddenly and how soon other new policies could be announced in
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the future.
Second, the new short-run regime is not specified with sufficient completeness
for it to be clear how large a cumulative increase in prices might be allowed before
the return to a more standard approach to policy. It is true that the FOMC only
states that the near-zero federal funds rate will be maintained as long as projected
inflation remains below 2.5 percent; but it does not actually commit to raising rates
in the event that this threshold is breached, it simply does not commit not to raise
them in that case. Because two thresholds are specified — one for the unemployment
rate and one for the inflation projection — as determinants of a single decision, it
is unclear what should be expected to happen in the event that the two indicators
give opposite signals — that is, if the inflation projection were to exceed 2.5 percent
while unemployment remains well above 6.5 percent. To the extent that one fears
that the FOMC would find it difficult to tighten policy while unemployment remained
above the announced threshold, after having offered a precise numerical benchmark,
one would have reason to fear a scenario under which inflation could be allowed to
run above the long-run target rate for a considerable period or to a considerable
extent, as a result of a mis-judgment of the current location of the natural rate of
unemployment.
An alternative approach would have had significant advantages on these dimen-
sions. The FOMC might instead have committed themselves to maintain a federal
funds rate near zero as long as the level of nominal GDP continues to fall short of
a target path, while explaining that they would raise the federal funds rate target
when necessary to prevent NGDP from overshooting that path; thereafter, they could
explain, the funds rate would be managed so as to keep NGDP close to the path.
The target path might be chosen in accordance with (1.15); that is, the target path
for the log of NGDP could be chosen to equal the log of the FOMC’s estimate of the
path of potential real GDP, plus a nominal factor that grows deterministically at a
constant rate corresponding to the long-run inflation target. The initial level of the
nominal factor could be chosen so that the announced target path would represent a
continuation of the path of nominal GDP prior to the crisis — that is, prior to the
point at which at ceased to be possible for the Fed to keep nominal GDP on its prior
trend path using its normal procedures.
Figure 10 illustrates what such a target path might look like, under the current






















2007 2009 2011 2013
Billions of Dollars Billions of Dollars
Target Path
Nominal GDP
Figure 10: US nominal GDP compared with a target path based on the CBO estimate
of potential real GDP, as explained in the text. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis
and Congressional Budget Office.
Budget Office’s 2012 estimate of the path of US real GDP, plus a nominal factor
growing at a constant rate of 2 percent per year, with the intercept chosen so that
the nominal GDP target exactly equals actual nominal GDP in the first quarter of
2007, the last quarter in which real GDP was (according to the CBO) at potential,
and one prior to the sharp drop in nominal GDP relative to its previous trend — hence
a quarter in which one might suppose that the FOMC achieved a level of nominal
expenditure reasonably close to the one that it desired. (The initial level of the target
path might be determined in a different way, for example so as to splice the target
path going forward with an estimated trend for the years immediately prior to the
crisis, without materially changing the message of Figure 10.)
One observes that since the onset of the financial crisis, nominal GDP has fallen
well below this target path, and continues to run below it — still about 8 percentage
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points below as of the first quarter of 2013, with little sign that the gap is closing.43
Hence a commitment to maintain the federal funds rate near zero until this gap
is closed would imply that the funds rate target would not be increased anytime
soon; indeed, a substantial acceleration of the growth rate of nominal GDP would be
required in order for the funds rate to be raised before the end of 2015, as currently
expected by most members of the FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee, 2013).
At the same time, it would also achieve the other goal of the FOMC’s thresholds,
namely, placing a bound on the amount of inflation that the policy might turn out
to involve, by strictly limiting the cumulative nominal growth that would be allowed.
To the extent that one expects that eventually, real GDP must return to the path
of potential estimated by the CBO — which must almost certainly be the case, if
the CBO’s estimate of potential is correct — then the cumulative inflation resulting
from the policy, integrating forward from 2007Q1, can be no more than two percent
per year. Greater inflation would be possible if the CBO’s estimate turned out to be
incorrect, and the target path were not adjusted in response to the changed estimate
of potential; but even then, the number of percentage points of cumulative growth in
the price level that could result would be limited by the number of percentage points
by which the CBO has over-estimated potential, and this would be unlikely to be
large.
At the same time, this alternative form of intermediate target would avoid the
disadvantages of the FOMC’s thresholds cited above. Because a threshold for a
single variable (albeit one that involves both the general level of prices and the real
economy) would be offered as the criterion for determining when it is appropriate to
tighten policy, the criterion offered would be more complete, and so would allow less
ambiguity to remain — both about how much nominal growth might be allowed for
the sake of the FOMC’s goals for the real economy, and about whether policy might
be tightened prematurely owing to an inflation scare. It ought to have a particular
advantage in bounding uncertainty about future inflation, because it would involve a
commitment to a nominal level variable, rather than only a growth rate; hence the
policy would ensure that actual nominal growth would be limited, and not merely
the amount of growth that was forecasted some years in advance.
And if the NGDP level path were determined in the way proposed above, it would
43The cumulative decline in the gap has been less than 0.8 percentage points since 2009Q4, a rate
of convergence of less than a quarter of a percentage point per year.
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be possible to present the policy as simply extending the principles that have guided
FOMC policy in the past to novel circumstances, rather than a break with past
policy; the temporary period of unusually accommodative policy would be justified
by the fact that nominal GDP had been allowed to fall below its previous trend path
to an unusual extent. Even more importantly, the policy announced for the next
few years would be completely consistent with the policy that the FOMC would also
want the public to anticipate will be followed farther in the future. The near-term
commitment would be to increasing nominal GDP fast enough to return to the target
path; but since the target path is chosen to be one that, if followed for a period of
years, would guarantee an average inflation rate near the declared long-run target
rate, an expectation that the FOMC would continue to make interest-rate policy on
the basis of that target path would be fully consistent with what the FOMC has said
about its longer-term policy intentions.
Thus the particular form of thresholds adopted by the FOMC are not obviously
ideal, even as a solution for the special circumstances currently facing the Fed, and
under the institutional constraints resulting from the Fed’s history, legislative man-
date, and declared policy commitments. It is even less apparent that they should be
adopted by other inflation-targeting central banks, in the case that they find them-
selves constrained by an effective lower bound on their policy rate. As I have argued
above, a bank that seeks to practice inflation-forecast targeting needs in any event
an intermediate target criterion as a basis for the forecast-targeting exercise through
which short-term policy decisions are made, and this criterion should be one that
is consistent with — indeed, the consistent pursuit of which should imply achieve-
ment of — the bank’s inflation target in the medium-to-long run. (A fixed target for
the unemployment rate, for example, would thus be unsuitable as a proposal of this
form.) And if the target criterion that is adopted has the right form — specifically,
if it specifies a target path for the level of some nominal variable and not merely the
projected rate of growth looking forward from each date — there will be no need to
change its form in response to a series of target misses owing to a binding interest-
rate lower bound. A commitment to a target criterion such as a nominal GDP level
path would already solve the problem which the FOMC’s thresholds are intended to
address, so that there would be no advantage to an introduction of temporary, ad
hoc thresholds as a modification of the standard forecast-targeting procedure.
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3 Conclusion
Inflation-targeting central banks have been notable for the amount of information that
they provide to the public, not only about their longer-run goals, but about the way
in which they expect to conduct policy in the future in order to achieve those goals.
For reasons discussed above, I regard this development as a positive one. Greater
clarity within the policy committee itself about the way in which policy is expected
to be conducted in the future is likely to lead to more coherent policy decisions, and
greater clarity on the part of the public as to how policy will be conducted is likely to
improve the degree to which the central bank can count on achieving the effects that
it intends through its policy. The value of this dimension of policy has become all the
more apparent under the conditions recently encountered by many central banks, in
which they have found themselves constrained by an effective lower bound on their
policy rates.
But while the procedures developed by inflation-targeting central banks over the
first two decades of inflation targeting represent important advances in the practice
of central banking, and while important progress has been made over the course of
that period — especially by methodological innovators like Sveriges Riksbank and
Norges Bank — there remain dimensions on which the practice of inflation-forecast
targeting could still be improved, relating to the degree to which explicit guidance
is given about the way in which future policy decisions will be made. Two of these
are of particular importance: the adoption of a more explicit intermediate target
criterion to guide short-term policy decisions, that would explain how the projected
effects of monetary policy on the real economy are traded off against its projected
effects on inflation, and the introduction of a commitment to error-correction into
the forecast-targeting procedure, by targeting the cumulative growth in a nominal
variable (such as nominal GDP), rather than only its expected growth rate looking
forward.
In my view, such changes could be viewed as a completion of the program of
flexible inflation targeting, making the meaning of the central bank’s policy commit-
ments more explicit and enhancing the transparency of decisionmaking, rather than
a modification of the objectives of policy, or even a fundamental change in the ba-
sic approach. Nonetheless, I believe that they would go a considerable way toward
answering many of the critics who argue that inflation targeting has failed as an
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approach, and should be replaced. In particular, they would address two important
difficulties exposed by recent developments. The first is the observation that in coun-
tries where (implicit or explicit) inflation targeting has achieved considerable stability
of the inflation rate over the past two decades, even large variations in the output gap
now seem to result in only mild changes in inflation or in inflation expectations; but
this raises doubts about whether success in containing inflation and inflation expecta-
tions within acceptable bounds should be considered sufficient grounds for regarding
monetary policy as successful. Some would draw the conclusion that inflation targets
should be abandoned. The adoption of an intermediate target criterion, such as a tar-
get path for nominal GDP, that is however chosen to be consistent with (and indeed
to deliver) the target inflation rate over the medium run, can address this objection,
by providing a basis for short-run policy decisions that clearly would not ignore the
level of real activity, while nonetheless retaining the focus on delivering a particular
inflation rate over the medium run.
The second difficulty is the possibility that policy can be constrained by an effec-
tive lower bound on the policy rate. An expectation that the central bank will remain
committed to a strict inflation target limits its ability to create the sort of expecta-
tions about future policy that provide the only channel through which interest-rate
policy can provide additional macroeconomic stimulus in such a situation (as empha-
sized by Krugman, 1998); hence some would argue that the recognition that such a
situation can arise in practice, and not only in theory, is a ground for abandoning
inflation targets. But if inflation targeting is implemented through a commitment to
a target path for the level of nominal GDP (or a similar nominal level variable), then
a period of persistent target shortfalls owing to the binding lower-bound constraint
on policy will require (and should be expected to require) a period of unusually ag-
gressive easing to catch up with the target path again. Thus it should automatically
create the kind of expectations regarding future policy that Krugman (1998) and oth-
ers have called for, but without requiring even a temporary abandonment of standard
policy targets. If the practice of inflation-forecast targeting is developed in this way,
there will be less reason to doubt its suitability as an approach to the conduct of
monetary policy adequate to the challenges of the twenty-first century.
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